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iiAbstract
This dissertation consists of three essays, which study the implication of ﬁnancial frictions in
business cycles and monetary policy making. The ﬁrst essay develops a Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) model to study how the instability of the banking sector can
amplify and propagate business cycles. Model simulations show that in an economic down
turn, in addition to credit demand contraction induced by low ﬁrm net worth, low bank capital
position can create strong credit supply contraction, and have a quantitatively signiﬁcant
effect on business cycle dynamics. The second essay studies the optimal Taylor-type monetary
policy rules based on the model developed in the ﬁrst chapter and ﬁnd that with interest
rate smoothing, ’leaning against the wind’ can signiﬁcantly dampen the procyclicality of
ﬁnancial distortions, and increase the welfare of the economy. The third chapter examines the
role of households frugality in a ﬁnancial crisis and ﬁnds that higher savings by more frugal
households provide an important cushion for the fall in private investment funding.
Keywords: asset prices, ﬁnancial frictions, monetary policy, banking instability,
savings, investment, business cycles
iiiivZusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation besteht aus drei Aufsätzen, die die Auswirkungen von Kapitalmarktfrik-
tionen auf Geldpolitik und Konjunkturverlauf untersuchen. Ich entwickle ein dynamisch-
stochastisches Gleichgewichtsmodell (DSGE) um zu prüfen, wie die Instabilität im Banken-
sektor Konjunkturzyklen verstärken und verbreiten kann (Kapitel 1); um ferner zu prüfen, ob
optimale Geldpolitik in einer durch Kreditfriktionen geprägten Wirtschaft gegen den Strom
schwimmen sollte (Kapitel 2); und um die Rolle privaten Sparens auf die Finanzkrise zu
untersuchen (Kapitel 3).
Das Thema dieser Arbeit wurde zu einer Zeit gewählt, in der die Weltwirtschaft ihre
schlimmste Finanzkrise seit Jahrzehnten erlebte. Die Krise griff schnell auf die Realwirtschaft
über und resultierte in einer weltweiten Rezession. Es wurde vielfach argumentiert, dass die
Zentralbanken zu sehr um die Inﬂation von Güterpreisen besorgt waren und beim Setzen
der Leitzinssätze zu wenig Augenmerk auf Kredit- und Kapitalkosten richteten. Dies spielte
eine beträchtliche Rolle in der Entstehung der Krise. Zudem spielten in der existierenden
makroökonomischen Literatur über Konjunkturzyklen der Bankensektor und mit ihm zusam-
menhängende Kapitalmarktfriktionen eine untergeordnete Rolle. Für lange Zeit glaubte man an
das Modigliani-Miller Theorem, welches besagt, dass die Finanzstruktur für realwirtschaftliche
Ergebnisse irrelevant sei und daher bei der Betrachtung von Konjunkturzyklen vernachlässigt
werden könne. Dies führte zur Entstehung einer großen Bandbreite von DSGE-Literatur,
welche sich lediglich mit realen Friktionen und nominalen Rigiditäten und den entsprechenden
Implikationen auf Geldpolitik beschäftigen. Die Finanzkrise der letzten Jahre zeigte, dass
Kapitalmarktfriktionen eine zentrale Rolle bei der Bestimmung der Länge und des Ausmaßes
einer Rezession spielen und Finanzschocks selbst Auslöser von Konjunkturzyklen sein können.
Zudem kann die Analyse optimaler Geldpolitik in einem theoretischen wirtschaftlichen Um-
feld ohne Kapitalmarktfriktionen zu verzerrten Ergebnissen und mit der Anwendung dieser
Ergebnisse zu ernsthaften Konsequenzen für die reale Welt führen. Vor diesem Hintergrund
erweitere ich ein kanonisches DSGE-Modell um den Bankensektor und dazugehörige Kapital-
marktfriktionen, um die Interaktion von Realwirtschaft und dem Finanzsektor zu untersuchen
(Kapitel 1). Aufbauend auf dem in Kapitel 1 entwickelten Modell untersuche ich dann, welche
Implikationen die Berücksichtigung von Kapitalmarktfriktionen für die Geldpolitik hat. Dabei
interessiert besonders, ob Geldpolitik Wertpapierpreise über die Zyklen stabilisieren sollte um
damit die Prozyklität ﬁnanzieller Verwerfungen zu dämpfen.
vAllgemein kann die Instabilität des Bankensektors von beiden Seiten der Bilanz herrühren.
Eine repräsentative Arbeit von Diamond und Dybvig (1983) zeigt die natürliche Instabilität auf
Seiten der Verbindlichkeiten. Aufgrund impliziter oder expliziter Garantien seitens des Staats
für Einlagen bei Banken werden Bank Runs weitgehend vermieden. Kapitel 1 konzentriert sich
daher auf Risiken auf Seiten der Aktiva der Banken. Diese Risiken beziehen sich dabei nicht
auf das Eingehen exzessiver und irrationaler Risiken seitens der Banker, sie spiegeln vielmehr
institutionelle Schwächen der Banken wider. Banken können bspw. zwar speziﬁsche Schocks
durch breite Anleihenportfolios minimieren, bleiben aber dennoch gegenüber systemischen
Risiken empﬁndlich. Grundlegende Ursache dafür ist, dass Banken mit Kreditnehmern kein
Set zustandsabhängiger Verträge abschließen können, um sich damit gegen alle makroökono-
mischen Umstände abzusichern.
Als Startpunkt habe ich entschieden, das Bernanke et al. (1999) Modell (im Folgenden BGG)
zu erweitern, welches die Rolle von Kreditnachfragefriktionen als Folge von asymmetrischen
Informationen zwischen Kreditnehmer und geber untersucht. Das Modell stellt einen Zu-
sammenhang zwischen den Fremdkapitalkosten eines Unternehmens und seinem Nettowert
her. Im Zuge eines Abschwungs erhöht sich die Verschuldungsquote des Unternehmens, was
aufgrund sich verschärfender Informationsasymmetrien wiederum seine Fremdkapitalkosten
erhöht. Die höheren Kosten führen folglich zu geringerer Kapitalnachfrage. Der Einbruch
der Kapitalnachfrage verstärkt den anfänglichen Rückgang des Netto-Unternehmenswerts
und verstärkt somit konjunkturellen Abschwung. Dieser Mechanismus ist in der Literatur
als Financial Accelerator bekannt. Allerdings können durch die Verwendung von Verträgen,
welche die Banken vor aggregierten Schocks schützen, das Kernproblem der Verknüpfung von
systemischen Risiken mit den Bilanzen der Banken sowie die damit verbundene Instabilität
im Bankensektor, welche über den Kreditmarkt auf die Volkswirtschaft übertragen wird,
vermieden werden. Dieser Zusammenhang zeigte in der Finanzkrise seine große Bedeutung.
Dieses erste Kapitel fokussiert sich auf die Finanzstruktur von Banken und die damit
zusammenhängenden Friktionen des Kreditangebots. Das grundlegende Modell ähnelt dem
BGG mit dem zentralen Unterschied, dass ﬁnanzielle Verträge mit einbezogen werden, auf
deren Grundlage sich Kreditnehmer und geber systemische Risiken teilen. Am Ende jeder
Periode wird ein Kreditvertrag basierend auf den Erwartungen der beiden Parteien im
Hinblick auf zukünftige wirtschaftliche Bedingungen unterzeichnet. Aggregierte Schocks
in der nächsten Periode werden zu einer höher als erwarteten Kreditausfallrate führen und
vidaher nicht nur die Bilanz der Firma, also ihren Nettowert, sondern auch die Bilanz der Bank
bzw. ihre Kapitalposition beeinﬂussen, weil die Bank mit hohen Abschreibungen infolge der
unerwarteten Kreditausfälle konfrontiert wird. Dies unterscheidet sich vom BGG Modell
insofern, als dass dort zustandsabhängige Verträge mit Unternehmern abgeschlossen werden,
die dazu führen, dass das Kreditportfolio der Bank von aggregierten Schocks unabhängig ist.
Die Bank muss nun zwischen einer Ausweitung seiner Aktiva und der Erhöhung der Finan-
zierungskosten abwägen, da Haushalte ein geringeres Verhältnis von Kapital und Aktiva als
instabilere Finanzstruktur auffassen und eine höhere Prämie für das Halten von Bankanteilen
verlangen. Zusätzlich zu den vom Financial Accelerator erfassten Kreditnachfragefriktionen
aufgrund des geringen Nettowerts der Firmen, führt eine ungünstige Kapitalposition von
Banken zu starken Kreditangebotsfriktionen. Diese beidseitigen Kreditfriktionen interagie-
ren und verstärken einander, was zu einem weiter verstärkten Abschwung der Wirtschaft führt.
Modellsimulationen zeigen, dass die Instabilität im Bankensektor alleine zu starken
Kreditangebotsfriktionen führen kann, welche kurzfristige Abschwünge signiﬁkant verstärken
können. Aus dem Bankensektor entstehende Schocks, wie etwa eine plötzliche Schrumpfung
des Bankenkapitals, können zu einem starken Abschwung der Realwirtschaft führen. Langfris-
tig impliziert die Instabilität im Bankensektor einen niedrigeren Kapitalstock in der Wirtschaft,
dessen Folgen geringeren Investitionsniveaus und geringerer Wirtschaftsleistung sind. Ich
vergleiche zudem die relativen Beiträge der verschiedenen Friktionen bei der Übermittlung
von Schocks und komme zu dem Schluss, dass das Bankkapital als Übermittler wichtiger bei
der Verstärkung von Geldpolitikschocks ist, als der Financial Accelerator. Dies stimmt mit
früheren Befunden aus der Literatur überein welche besagen, dass der Financial Accelerator
nur marginal zur Übertragung von Geldpolitik beiträgt. Die relative Bedeutung der beiden
Übertragungswege ist jedoch umgekehrt, wenn die Wirtschaft durch einen positiven Techno-
logieschock getroffen wird. In diesem Fall spielen starke Unternehmensbilanzen eine wichtige
Rolle bei der Erhöhung von Vermögenswerten und Investitionsvolumina.
Das Modell kann auch das seit langem bestehende Rätsel lösen, wieso aggregiertes Leihen nicht
sofort nach einem restriktiven Geldpolitikschock sinkt, sondern erst für vier bis sechs Quartale
steigt und dann erst sinkt. Der dahinter stehende Mechanismus ist, dass der Nettowert von
Firmen in der ersten Periode nach dem Schock stärker als die Preise der Aktiva sinken und
Firmen daher mehr auf externe Finanzierung angewiesen sind. In der folgenden Periode sinken
der Nettoﬁrmenwert langsamer und die Preise der Aktiva schneller, so dass externes Ausleihen
der Firma reduziert wird.
viiKapitel 2 verwendet eine Approximation zweiter Ordnung des Modells aus Kapitel 1,
um die wohlfahrtsmaximierende Geldpolitik zu untersuchen. Es gibt drei zentrale Ergebnis-
se: Erstens ist, ungeachtet dessen, ob die Zentralbank eine starke oder schwache Haltung
gegenüber Inﬂation hat, eine Glättung des Zinssatzes als Reaktion auf Vermögenspreise
strikt wohlfahrtsverbessernd. Zweitens ist der Wohlfahrtsgewinn kleiner aber immer noch
signiﬁkant, wenn eine starke Reaktion auf Output Teil der Geldpolitik ist. Drittens kann
ohne Zinssatzglättung eine zu starke Reaktion auf Vermögenspreise zu Unbestimmtheit des
Modells führen. Diese Ergebnisse stehen in Kontrast zu früheren Befunden welche unter
der Annahme einer starken Anti-Inﬂations-Haltung einen marginalen Wohlfahrtsgewinn der
Reaktion auf Vermögenspreise ermitteln. Der Grund hierfür ist, dass die Einbeziehung des Zu-
sammenhangs zwischen Vermögenspreisen und Instabilität des Bankensektors in das Modell
die Volatilität von Vermögenspreisen zu Instabilität auf dem Bankensektor führt, welche auf
die Realwirtschaft übergreift und dadurch Konjunkturzyklen verstärkt und verbreitet. Es ist
daher für Zentralbanken entscheidend, gegen den Strom zu schwimmen und die Prozyklität
ﬁnanzieller Verwerfungen und damit ihren Einﬂuss auf die Realwirtschaft zu mindern. Eine
weitere Beobachtung in der Krise, welche große Aufmerksamkeit erhielt, war die plötzlich
steigende Sparquote der Haushalte in vielen Ländern. In den USA brachten sowohl Politiker als
auch Wissenschaftler ihre Besorgnis zum Ausdruck, dass erhöhte Sparsamkeit der Haushalte
aufgrund des aus ihr resultierenden Rückgangs der aggregierten Nachfrage zu einer tieferen
und längeren Rezession führen wird. In Kapitel 3 lege ich dar, dass die Sparsamkeit der
Haushalte eine zentrale Rolle bei der letzten Rezession gespielt haben könnte, sie allerdings
nicht destabilisierend wirkte.
Die kürzlich erfolgte Rezession war größtenteils eine Bilanz-Rezession. Sie wurde durch
sinkendes Vertrauen in das Finanzsystem und einen widrigen Schock auf den Nettowert von
Unternehmen verursacht. Ein derartiger Schock wird sich in fallenden Unternehmensgewin-
nen und daher auch sinkenden einbehaltenen Gewinnen dem unternehmerischen Sparen
niederschlagen. Bei derartigen ﬁnanziellen Spannungen können sparsamere Haushalte zur
Stabilisierung der Wirtschaft beitragen, statt sie zu destabilisieren. Wie die Spar-Investitions-
Identitätzeigt,mussdasprivateKapitaleinerWirtschaftmitderSummeausunternehmerischer
Binnenersparnis, der Binnenhaushaltsersparnis, dem Haushaltsüberschuss der Regierung und
externer Ersparnis übereinstimmen. Daten der USA und einigen anderen industrialisierten
Volkswirtschaften legen nahe, dass sowohl Unternehmensgewinne, als auch Haushaltsüber-
viiischüsse der Regierungen während der Krise um durchschnittlich 5 % des BIP gesunken sind,
während gesamte Investitionsaufwendungen um 3,2 % des BIP sanken (der nicht-Binnenanteil
der Investitionen ﬁel sogar nur um 1 %). Dies legt nahe, dass die zusätzliche Haushaltsersparnis
den freien Fall der Investitionen aufgefangen hat. Aufgrund des zurückgegangenen Konsums
ist die Haushaltsersparnis um ca. 1,3 % des BIP angestiegen.
Ich untersuche das Zusammenspiel zwischen unternehmerischen Ersparnissen, Haushalts-
ersparnissen und privaten Kapitalinvestitionen in Zeitperioden ﬁnanzieller Spannungen in ei-
nem allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodell. Das Modell folgt größtenteils dem BGG-Ansatz, wur-
de aber modiﬁziert, um eine Geldstromanalyse zu vereinfachen. Ich modelliere eine Bilanzre-
zession als widrigen Schock für netto-Unternehmenswerte. Modellsimulationen sind konsistent
mit empirischen Beobachtungen und zeigen, dass während Perioden ﬁnanzieller Spannungen,
wenn unternehmerische Ersparnisse sinken, zusätzliche Haushaltsersparnisse eine wichtige al-
ternative Finanzierungsquelle zur Dämpfung des Falls der Investitionen sind.
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xivxvIntroduction
This dissertation consists of three essays, which study the implication of ﬁnancial frictions on
monetary policy making and business cycles. In particular, I develop a Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) model to study how the instability of the banking sector can
amplify and propagate business cycles (Chapter 1); study whether the optimal monetary policy
should "lean against the wind" in an economy that is characterized by credit frictions (Chapter
2); and investigate the role of household frugality in a ﬁnancial crisis (Chapter 3).
The topic of the thesis was chosen at a time when the world was experiencing the worst
ﬁnancial crisis in decades, which then rapidly spilled over to the real economy and resulted in
a worldwide recession. Many have argued that the focus on goods price inﬂation has made
central banks place insufﬁcient weight on credit and asset prices in interest rate setting, which
played an non-negligible role in the buildup to the crisis. However, the existing macro literature
on business cycles paid very little attention to the banking sector and related ﬁnancial frictions.
As for a long time, people have believed in the Modigliani-Miller proposition, which states
that ﬁnancial structure is irrelevant for real economic outcomes and therefore can be omitted
in business cycles analysis. This has given rise to an exuberance of DSGE literature focusing
only on real frictions and nominal rigidities and studying the corresponding implications for
monetary policy making.
The recent crisis has demonstrated that ﬁnancial frictions can play a central role in deter-
mining the length and depth of a recession and ﬁnancial shocks themselves can be a trigger of
business cycles. Also, studying optimal monetary policy based on an economy structure where
ﬁnancial frictions are assumed away can lead to biased results and such policy making may
have serious consequences in the real world. Against this backdrop, I extend a canonical DSGE
model with banking sector and related credit frictions to study the interaction between the
real economy and the ﬁnancial sector (Chapter 1). Based on the model developed in Chapter
1, I study what are the implications for monetary policy after taking ﬁnancial frictions into
consideration, especially I am interested in whether monetary policy should stabilize asset
prices over the cycles and consequently dampen the procyclicality of ﬁnancial distortions
(Chapter 2).
Generally speaking, the instability of the banking sector can arise on both sides of the
balance sheet. Representative work from Diamond and Dybvig (1983) shows the inherent
1instability coming from the bank’s liability side. However, given the explicit or implicit
government guarantee on bank deposits, bank runs have been mitigated to a large extent.
Chapter 1 therefore focuses on risks from the asset side. To be more speciﬁc, this risk does
not refer to the irrational excessive risk taking of bankers, rather, it reﬂects the institutional
weakness of banks, i.e., although banks can diversify away idiosyncratic shocks by holding a
large loan portfolio, they are still vulnerable to any systemic risk. A more fundamental reason
for this is that banks cannot sign a complete set of state-contingent contracts with borrowers to
insure against each macroeconomic state.
As a starting point, I choose to extend the Bernanke et al. (1999) (hereinafter BGG) model,
which investigated the role of credit demand friction, as a result of asymmetric information be-
tween the borrower and the lender. Their model established a link between a ﬁrm’s borrowing
cost and its net worth. In an economic downturn, ﬁrms’ leverage ratios increase, causing them
to face a higher external ﬁnance premium because information asymmetry is exacerbated. This
higher premium in turn dampens capital demand. The drop in capital demand thus reinforces
the initial decline of ﬁrms’ net worth and the business cycle is propagated. This mechanism
is known in the literature as the "ﬁnancial accelerator". However, by using ﬁnancial contracts
that insulate banks from aggregate shocks, they have avoided the key issue of linking systemic
risk to banks’ balance sheets and the related banking instability, which is then passed on to the
macro economy through the credit market. This linkage is shown to be of critical importance in
the recent crisis.
This ﬁrst chapter focuses on the ﬁnancial structure of banks and related credit supply
frictions. The basic model is similar to BGG, while the key difference is the integration of a
ﬁnancial contract where borrowers and lenders share systemic risk. At the end of each period,
a loan contract is signed based on the two parties’ expectation of future economic conditions.
Contractionary aggregate shocks in the next period will lead to a higher- than-expected loan
default rate and will therefore not only inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s balance sheet, i.e., net worth, but
also the bank’s balance sheet, or capital position, as the bank faces large write-offs from the un-
expected loan losses. This contrasts with the BGG model, in which banks issue state-contingent
contracts with entrepreneurs; therefore, returns on their loan portfolio are independent of any
aggregate shocks. Given their initial capital position, banks now face the trade-off between
increasing asset size and raising funding costs, as households perceive lower capital-asset ratio
as a more unstable ﬁnancial structure and charge a higher premium for holding banks’ equity.
2Therefore, in an economic downturn, in addition to the credit demand friction induced by low
ﬁrm net worth, as captured in a ﬁnancial accelerator, a low bank capital position also gives rise
to strong credit supply friction. Credit frictions from both sides will interact, and reinforce each
other, and drive the economy down further.
Model simulations show that the instability of the banking sector alone can create strong
credit supply frictions and can amplify and propagate short-run cycles signiﬁcantly. Shocks
that originate from the banking sector, e.g., a sudden decline in the bank capital, can lead to
strong contraction in the real economy. In the long run, the instability of the banking sector
implies a lower capital stock in the economy and therefore a lower level of investment and
output.
I also compare the relative contribution of various frictions in shock transmission and ﬁnd
that the bank capital channel is more important than the ﬁnancial accelerator in amplifying
monetary policy shocks. This is consistent with previous ﬁndings in the literature that the
ﬁnancial accelerator contributes only marginally to monetary policy transmission. However,
the relative importance of the two channels is reversed when a positive technology shock hits
the economy. In this case, strong corporate balance sheets play an important role in driving up
asset prices and investment.
The model can also explain the long-established puzzle that aggregate lending does not
decline immediately following a contractionary monetary policy shock but increases for four
to six quarters and then falls. The mechanism behind this phenomenon is that ﬁrm’s net worth
contracts faster than asset prices in the initial period following a negative policy shock, and that
therefore ﬁrms have to rely more on external ﬁnancing. In the following period, contraction
of ﬁrm’s net worth slows down, while asset price is declining faster, so that ﬁrm’s external
borrowing declines.
Chapter 2 uses a second-order approximation of the model developed in Chapter 1 to study
the welfare-optimizing monetary policy. The main ﬁndings are threefold: First, with interest
rate smoothing, responding to asset price is strictly welfare improving regardless whether
the central bank has a strong or weak stance on inﬂation; second, the additional welfare
gain is smaller but still signiﬁcant if strong reaction to output is included in the policy rule;
Third, without interest rate smoothing, too strong reaction to asset prices may lead to model
3indeterminacy. These results are in contrast with previous ﬁndings that conditional on strong
anti-inﬂation stance, responding to asset price has marginal welfare gain. The reason is that
once the link between asset prices and banking instability is incorporated into the model, high
volatility of asset prices leads to banking instability, which spills over to the real economy,
therefore amplifying and propagating business cycles. It is therefore crucial for central banks
to ’lean against the wind’ to dampen the procyclicality of ﬁnancial distortions and their impact
on real economy.
Another observation from the crisis that received great attention is the sudden increase
of household savings in many countries. In the U.S., both policy makers and scholars have
expressed their concerns that the emergence of household frugality will lead to a deeper and
prolonged recession by reducing aggregate demand. In Chapter 3, I argue that while household
frugality may have played a key role in the recent global downturn, that role may not have
been a destabilizing one.
The recent economic downturn was in large part a "balance sheet" recession. It was brought
on by a fall of conﬁdence in the ﬁnancial system and an adverse shock to corporate net worth.
Such a shock will be reﬂected in a fall in corporate proﬁts, including the retained component —
corporate savings. Under such ﬁnancial stress, more thrifty households can help stabilize the
economy - rather than destabilize it. As the saving — investment identity shows, an economy’s
private capital investment must equal to the sum of domestic corporate savings, domestic
household savings, the government budget surplus, and external savings. Data from US and
several other industrialized economies suggest that both corporate earnings and government
budget surpluses fell substantially by an average of around 5% of GDP during the crisis, while
total investment expenditures fell by about 3.2% of GDP (the non-residential component of
investment fell only by 1%). This suggests that extra household savings helped cushion the free
fall of investment. Owing to a fall in their consumption, savings by household rose by about
1.3% of GDP.
I examine the interplay between corporate saving, household saving, and private capital
investment during periods of ﬁnancial stress in a general equilibrium framework. The model
largely follows the BGG model, but are reinterpreted to facilitate a ﬂow-of-funds analysis.
I model a "‘balance sheet recession"’ as an adverse shock to corporate net worth. Model
simulations are broadly consistent with empirical observations and show that: during periods
4of ﬁnancial stress, when corporate earnings fall, extra household savings are an important
alternative ﬁnancing source to buffer the fall of investment.
51 Bank Capital Regulation, the Lending Channel and
Business Cycles
This chapter develops a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model to study how
the instability of the banking sector can amplify and propagate business cycles. The model
builds on Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (BGG) (1999), who consider credit demand frictions
duetoagencycost, butitdeviatesfromBGGinthatﬁnancialintermediarieshavetoshareaggre-
gate riskwith entrepreneurs, and therefore bear uncertainty intheir loan portfolios. Unexpected
aggregate shocks will drive loan default rate away from expected, and have an impact on both
ﬁrm and bank’s balance sheets via the ﬁnancial contract. In an economic down turn, in addi-
tion to credit demand contraction induced by low ﬁrm net worth, low bank capital position can
create strong credit supply contraction, and have a quantitatively signiﬁcant effect on business
cycle dynamics.
1.1 Introduction
Financial frictions have long been ignored in the literature on business cycles. The main
theoretical justiﬁcation for this omission is the Modigliani-Miller proposition, which implies
that ﬁnancial structure is irrelevant for real economic outcomes. However, the 2008 ﬁnancial
crisis has demonstrated that ﬁnancial conditions play a central role in determining how real
shocks are transmitted through the economy. It has also shown that ﬁnancial disturbance
itself can be a source of economic ﬂuctuations. Moreover, many historical episodes illustrate
that distressed banking systems and adverse credit market conditions have either triggered or
contributed to serious macroeconomic contractions.1 Yet in the canonical Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) models, there is no ﬁnancial sector and consequently no ﬁnancial
shocks. Recently, a number of authors have sought to incorporate the banking sector and
related credit frictions into DSGE models to study the interaction between the real economy
and the ﬁnancial sector. This paper is part of that effort.
Generally speaking, there are two aspects in integrating credit market frictions: one is
the credit friction from the demand side, and the other is from the supply side. Bernanke
and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke et al. (1999) (hereinafter BGG) investigated the role of credit
demand friction, as a result of asymmetric information between the borrower and the lender.
Their model established a link between a ﬁrm’s borrowing cost and its net worth. In an
1These include past crises in Scandinavia, Latin America, Japan, and other East Asian countries.
6economic downturn, ﬁrms’ leverage ratios increase, causing them to face a higher external
ﬁnance premium because information asymmetry is exacerbated. This higher premium in turn
reduces capital demand. The drop in capital demand thus reinforces the initial decline of ﬁrms’
net worth and the business cycle is propagated. This mechanism is known in the literature as
the "ﬁnancial accelerator".
In terms of supply side friction, however, the vulnerability of the ﬁnancial intermediary
itself has not been incorporated into DSGE models. Recent models have tried to link the
ﬁnancial structure of banks to their lending rate to motivate the role of bank capital (e.g.
Markovic (2006), Aguiar and Drumond (2007)) or have explained the function of banks in a
detailed manner (Gerali et al. (2009), Christiano et al. (2007) ). However, by using ﬁnancial
contracts that insulate banks from aggregate shocks, they have avoided the key issue of linking
systemic risk to banks’ balance sheets and the related banking instability, which is then passed
on to the macro economy through the credit market. This linkage is shown to be of critical
importance in the recent crisis.
This paper focuses on the ﬁnancial structure of banks and related credit supply frictions.
The basic model is a closed economy DSGE model similar to BGG. The key deviation from
the basic model is the integration of a ﬁnancial contract where borrowers and lenders share
systemic risk. At the end of each period, a loan contract is signed based on the two parties’
expectation of future economic conditions. Contractionary aggregate shocks in the next period
will lead to a higher- than-expected loan default rate and will therefore not only inﬂuence the
ﬁrm’s balance sheet, i.e., net worth, but also the bank’s balance sheet, or capital position, as the
bank faces large write-offs from the unexpected loan losses. This contrasts with the BGG model,
in which banks issue state-contingent contracts with entrepreneurs; therefore, returns on their
loan portfolio are independent of any aggregate shocks. Given their initial capital position,
banks face the trade-off between increasing asset size and raising funding costs, as households
perceive lower capital-asset ratio as a more unstable ﬁnancial structure and charge a higher
premium for holding banks’ equity. Therefore, in an economic downturn, in addition to the
credit demand friction induced by low ﬁrm net worth, as captured in a ﬁnancial accelerator, a
low bank capital position also gives rise to strong credit supply friction. Credit frictions from
both sides will interact, and reinforce each other, and drive the economy down further.
Model simulations show that the instability of the banking sector alone can create strong
7credit supply frictions and can amplify and propagate short-run cycles signiﬁcantly. Shocks
that originate from the banking sector, e.g., a sudden decline in the bank capital, can lead to
strong contraction in the real economy. In the long run, the instability of the banking sector
implies a lower capital stock in the economy and therefore a lower level of investment and
output.
This paper also compares the relative contribution of various frictions in shock transmis-
sion. Three cases are considered. In the ﬁrst case, only nominal rigidities and capital adjustment
costs are considered; in the second, a ﬁnancial accelerator effect is added; in the third case,
the bank balance sheet channel is incorporated. Model simulations show that the bank capital
channel is more important than the ﬁnancial accelerator in amplifying policy shocks. This is
consistent with previous ﬁndings in the literature that the ﬁnancial accelerator contributes
only marginally to monetary policy transmission.2However, the relative importance of the two
channels is reversed when a positive technology shock hits the economy. In this situation,
strong corporate balance sheets play an important role in driving up asset prices and increasing
aggregate investment.
The model can also explain the long-established puzzle that aggregate lending does not
decline immediately following a contractionary monetary policy shock but increases for four to
six quarters and then falls. (Christiano et al. (1996) ). The mechanism behind this phenomenon
is that ﬁrm’s net worth contracts faster than asset prices in the initial period following a
negative policy shock, and that therefore ﬁrms have to rely more on external ﬁnancing. In the
following period, contraction of ﬁrm’s net worth slows down, while asset price is declining
faster, so that ﬁrm’s external borrowing declines.
This paper is also related to the banking literature which focuses on the fragility of ﬁnancial
intermediaries. Representative work from Diamond and Dybvig (1983) shows the inherent
instability coming from the bank’s liability side. Given the explicit or implicit government
guarantee on bank deposit, this problem has been mitigated to a large extent. This paper shows
the banking instability arising from the asset side. i.e., although banks can diversify away
idiosyncratic shocks by holding a large loan portfolio, they are still vulnerable to any systemic
risk. Another key difference is that in this model, ﬁnancial instability is driven by fundamentals
rather than pure self-fulﬁlling expectations.
2See Meier and Mueller (2006), Christensen and Dib (2008).
8The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 describes the calibration strategy. Section 4 discusses the effect of the bank capital channel on
long-run steady states and short-run dynamics. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Model
The economy is inhabited by four types of agents: households, entrepreneurs, retailers and
bankers. The structure of the basic model is the following: Bankers raise equity and deposit
from the households, and then intermediate these funds to the entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs
combine their own net worth and the money they borrowed from banks to purchase physical
capital, which will be used in aggregate production together with labor supplied by house-
holds. The product will then be differentiated in the retail sector to become ﬁnal goods, which
is either invested or consumed by the agents. Nominal Return on risk-free assets (i.e.,deposit)
is set by the central bank, who conducts monetary policy following a Taylor rule. Banks are
subject to regulatory requirement on minimum capital ratio.
Next, we will present a ﬁnancial contract where borrowers and lenders share aggregate risk,
and then integrate it into a general equilibrium.
1.2.1 The Financial Contract
In this part, we discuss the design of an optimal ﬁnancial contract between entrepreneurs and
banks, which is the key deviation of our model to the original BGG model. The contract is
derived in a partial equilibrium setting, taking the price of capital goods, entrepreneurs’ net
worth, the cost of deposits and bank capital as given. We then imbed the optimal contract in
the general equilibrium setting.
There are two parties to the contract: an entrepreneur with net worth and a ﬁnancial
intermediary, which we call "bank". Bank takes deposit from and issue equity to households
to ﬁnance the loan demanded by entrepreneurs. We will discuss the detail of the banking
sector later. Both parties are assumed to be risk-neutral. At the end of period t, a continuum
of entrepreneurs (indexed by i 2 (0;1)) need to purchase capital for production at t + 1. The
quantity of capital purchased by entrepreneur i is denoted Ki
t+1. The price of capital in period t
is qt (in real term). The return on capital is subject to both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. The
ex-post gross return to entrepreneur i is !i
t+1Rk
t+1, where !i
t+1 is an idiosyncratic productivity
9shock to entrepreneur i, and Rk
t+1 is the ex-post aggregate rate of return on capital. !i
t+1 is
identically and independently distributed (across time and entrepreneurs) with log-normal
distribution and unit mean.
To ﬁnance the purchase of capital, entrepreneurs use internal funds (net worth) and borrow
the rest from a bank. Let Ni
t+1 denote the net worth of entrepreneur i at the end of period of t;
then borrows from the bank is the following:
Li
t+1 = qtKi
t+1   Ni
t+1 (1.1)
!i
t+1 is private information to entrepreneur i and the bank has to pay a monitoring cost to ob-
serve it. Entrepreneurs observe the realization of !i
t+1 and decide whether to repay the debt or
default. If they repay the debt, they pay RL
t+1Lt+1. RL
t+1 is the gross loan rate speciﬁed in the
contract that the entrepreneur need to pay to the bank. It can be ﬁxed or state-contingent. If
they default, the bank seizes the entrepreneur’s remaining assets after paying the monitoring
cost.3 For a particular value of RK
t+1, there is a corresponding cut-off value of idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity !i
t+1, such that, if the realization of the idiosyncratic productivity falls below it, the
entrepreneur defaults. That is:
!i
t+1Rk
t+1qtKi
t+1 = RL
t+1Li
t+1 (1.2)
The monitoring cost is assumed to equal a proportion  of the realized gross capital return
!i
t+1Rk
t+1qtKi
t+1. Parameter  captures the degree of monitoring cost or information asymmetry.
4
In BGG, entrepreneurs are assumed to bear all the aggregate risk. By issuing state-
contingent loan contract, banks are insulated from aggregate shocks and always obtain risk-free
rate of return on loan portfolios . The optimal contract, as a result, maximizes the expected
return to entrepreneurs as following:
maxEt
(Z 1
!i
t+1
!i
t+1Rk
t+1qtKi
t+1f(!i
t+1)d!   (1   F(!i
t+1))!i
t+1Rk
t+1qtKi
t+1
)
(1.3)
where expectations are taken with respect to the random variable Rk
t+1, and !i
t+1 is a function
of realization of Rk
t+1 (and therefore, function of the states). f(.) and F(.) are respectively the
3see Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) .
4The existence of the banking sector in this paper is taken as given. It could also be motivated by
assuming that banks have information advantage compared to households in monitoring the project
outcome, i.e. bank < households.
10density function and the cumulative distribution function of the random variable !. The opti-
mal contract must observe the participation constraints of the bank as well, such that, for each
possible realization of states of nature (and therefore, Rk
t+1 and !i
t+1) the contract satisﬁes:
(1   F(!i
t+1))RL
t+1Li
t+1 + (1   )
Z !i
t+1
0
!EtRk
t+1qtKi
t+1f(!)d! = R
f
t+1Li
t+1 (1.4)
In equation (4), the left hand side shows that banks’ return on the loan portfolio has two
components: the loan amount that is paid back by the entrepreneurs, and, in the default case,
the acquisition of the ﬁrm’ remaining assets after paying off the monitoring cost. R
f
t+1 is the
funding cost of the bank, which will be determined in the general equilibrium. Since the
participation constraints hold for each realization of Rk
t+1, banks face no uncertainty in the
return on loan portfolio, which equals to the risk-free rate.
The risk-sharing rule among entrepreneurs and banks is a bit stylized, nonetheless.5 In
reality, banks face great uncertainty in their loan portfolio. The major source of uncertainty is
shocks to default risk. To account for this, we assume that aggregate risk is shared between banks
and entrepreneurs. The ﬁnancial contract cannot be therefore contingent on the realized capital return
but has to be written based on the two parties’ expectation of capital return in the next period.6 Under
this risk sharing rule, we have to make a distinction between the ex-post loan default threshold
!
i;b
t+1 and the ex-ante !
i;a
t+1.
Let EtRk
t+1 denote the expected capital return at the end of period t. We assume that the
entrepreneur can only offer the contract based on EtRk
t+1 instead of all possible realizations of Rk
t+1.
7The contract maximizes the expected return of the entrepreneur as following:
Z 1
!
i;a
t+1
!i
t+1EtRk
t+1qtKi
t+1f(!i
t+1)d!   (1   F(!
i;a
t+1))!
i;a
t+1EtRk
t+1qtKi
t+1 (1.5)
where !
i;a
t+1 is the cut-off idiosyncratic productivity that the entrepreneur is expected to default
in period t+1 based on information up to period t. Correspondingly, the participation constraint
of banks is also based on EtRk
t+1 :
(1   F(!
i;a
t+1))RL
t+1Li
t+1 + (1   )
Z !
i;a
t+1
0
!i
t+1EtRk
t+1qtKi
t+1f(!i
t+1)d! = R
f
t+1Li
t+1 (1.6)
5See footnote 10 in their paper.
6A state-contingent contract could be prevented by assuming that the state of the economy is not
observed by the enforcement of the contract, but only observed at the very end of the period when people
form expectations for the next period.
7Our assumption actually simpliﬁes the characterization of the ﬁnancial contract, as it corresponds to
the problem of solving one case of no aggregate risk in the original BGG.
11By solving the contract we obtain the credit demand equation (see Appendix A ):
EtRk
t+1 = S(
qtKi
t+1
Ni
t+1
)R
f
t+1 (1.7)
The property and interpretation of S(.) is identical to BGG, where S denotes the external ﬁnance
premium, which captures the wedge (driven by the existence of monitoring cost) between the
cost of ﬁnance from the ﬁrm’s side and the cost of funds from the bank’s side. S0> 0, implying
that the higher is the leverage ratio of ﬁrms, the higher is the external ﬁnance premium.
After solving the optimal contract, the contractual lending rate could be derived as
RL
t+1 =
!
i;a
t+1EtRk
t+1qtKi
t+1
Li
t+1
(1.8)
Note that in this model the contractual lending rate is ﬁxed and independent to the realizations
of the return on capital in t+1, whereas in BGG the lending rate is state-contingent:
RL
t+1 =
!i
t+1Rk
t+1qtKi
t+1
Li
t+1
(1.9)
.
In period t+1, given the speciﬁed loan rate RL
t+1 and the realized return on capital, the ex-
post default threshold !i;b is now determined by:
!
i;b
t+1 =
RL
t+1Li
t+1
Rk
t+1qtKi
t+1
(1.10)
Recall that the expected default threshold is deﬁned by:
!
i;a
t+1EtRk
t+1qtKi
t+1 = RL
t+1Li
t+1 (1.11)
This implies:
!
i;b
t+1 =
!
i;a
t+1EtRk
t+1
Rk
t+1
(1.12)
From this expression, we see that any deviation of the realized capital return from expected
one will drive a wedge between ex-post loan default rate and ex-ante. We will discuss its impact
on banking sector and aggregate economy later.
121.2.2 General Equilibrium
In this section, we analyze how aggregate shocks can inﬂuence ﬁrm and bank’s balance sheet
via the ﬁnancial contract in a general equilibrium. In addition to a ﬁrm’s credit demand curve
which is contingent on its net worth ( capturing the traditional ﬁnancial accelerator effect), this
model also derives an implicit credit supply curve, which is contingent on bank’s capital posi-
tion.
Households There is a continuum of households in the economy, each indexed by i 2 (0;1).
They consume the ﬁnal good, ct, invest in risk free bank deposits, dt+1, and bank equity, et+1,
supply labor ht and own shares in a monopolistically competitive sector that produces differen-
tiated varieties of goods. The households maximize the utility function:8
maxEt
1 X
k=0
k[ln(ct+k) +
d
1+'
t+k+1
1 + '
+ ln(1   ht+k)] (1.13)
subject to the sequence of budget constraints:
dt+1 + et+1 + ct = wtht + Rd
tdt + Re
t(1   t)et + t (1.14)
dt+1 and et+1 are deposits and bank equity(in real terms) held by the household from t to t+1.
Rd
t and Re
t reﬂect the gross real return on holding deposit and bank equity, and t is the default
rate on bank capital. ht is household labor supply, wt is the real wage for household labor, t is
dividends received from ownership of retail ﬁrms. Following Van den Heuvel (2008), the liquid-
ity services of bank deposits are modeled by assuming that the household has a derived utility
function that is increasing in the amount of deposits. The households’ optimization problem
yields following ﬁrst-order conditions:
Uc(ct) = EtRe
t+1(1   t+1)Uc(ct+1) (1.15)
Uc(ct)   Ud(dt+1) = EtRd
t+1Uc(ct+1) (1.16)
 Uc;t=Uh;t = wt (1.17)
Equation (15) shows that households’ intertemporal consumption decisions are determined by
the default-adjusted return on holding bank equity. Equation (16) shows the optimality con-
dition on bank deposit. Equation (17) describes the usual trade-off between consumption and
8Inserting deposits into the utility function is just a modeling device to capture the bank’ liquidity
creation function. Model dynamics are robust if we consider a standard utility function with only con-
sumption and leisure.
13leisure. In the model set up, bank equity has to offer higher return than deposit for two reasons:
the ﬁrst is the liquidity premium, since deposits can provide households extra utility in addi-
tion to carry a monetary reward; the second is to compensate for the default risk. As will be
discussed later, banks will be shut down and default on capital return when their capital ratios
fall below the regulatory threshold.9
Entrepreneurs Other than difference in the ﬁnancial contract, the entrepreneur sector at the
aggregate level is identical to the BGG. We describe the entrepreneur sector for completeness
purpose below. After signing the ﬁnancial contract, entrepreneurs combine loans acquired from
the bank and their own net worth to purchase capital. They use capital and labor to produce
wholesale goods and sell them on a perfect competitive market at a price equal to their nominal
marginal cost. The aggregate production function is given by :
Yt = AtKk
t (ht)h(he
t)e(hb
t)b (1.18)
Following BGG, We assumed entrepreneurs and bankers supply one unit of labor services
inelastically to the general labor market: he
t = hb
t = 1. As will be see later, e and b are
calibrated so that these two additional labor forces have a negligible effect on the output level
and model dynamics.10
The optimization problem of production remains standard:
zt = kmct
Yt
Kt
(1.19)
wt = hmct
Yt
ht
(1.20)
we
t = emct
Yt
he
t
(1.21)
wb
t = bmct
Yt
hb
t
(1.22)
where zt is the real rental rate of capital and wt,we
t and wb
t are, respectively, the real wage of
households, entrepreneurs and bankers. mct denotes real marginal cost. The expected return
on capital is then:
EtRk
t+1 = Et

zt+1 + (1   )qt+1
qt

(1.23)
9This paper assumes a relationship between households and bankers as delegated monitoring. There-
fore, households do not care about the capital structure of banks in their decision.
10The salary that bankers earn from labor supply could be understood as fee income collected from
transaction services, a function of ﬁnancial intermediaries that is not modeled in the paper.
14The accumulation of entrepreneurs’ net worth consists of two parts: proﬁts from operating
the ﬁrms and labor income. It is assumed that, in every period, entrepreneur will die with the
probability 1   
. This assumption ensures that entrepreneurs never accumulate enough net
worth to ﬁnance a project without external ﬁnancing. Those entrepreneurs who die at time t
will consume (1   
)Vt. The evolution of aggregate net worth is therefore given by:
Nt+1 = 
Vt + we
t (1.24)
where Vt represents gross return on operating business. It is the difference between gross
capital return and loan payment.
Vt =
Z 1
!b
!Rk
t+1qtKt+1f(!)d!   (1   F(!b))RL
t+1Li
t+1 (1.25)
Capital Producers Capital producers purchase a fraction of ﬁnal goods from the retailer as
investment goods it and combine this with the existing capital stock to obtain capital stock in
the next period. A quadratic capital adjustment cost is included to motivate a variable price of
capital, which contributes to the volatility of ﬁrm net worth and bank capital. Capital producers
will choose the quantity of investment goods to maximize proﬁt subject to the adjustment cost:
maxEt
"
qtit   it  

2

it
kt
  
2
kt
#
(1.26)
where qt is the real price of capital. The optimization problem yields the following capital sup-
ply curve:
qt = 1 + (
it
kt
  ) (1.27)
where  captures the sensitivity of capital price to investment ﬂuctuation. The higher  is, the
more volatile the price of capital. The aggregate capital stock evolves according to:
kt+1 = it + (1   )kt (1.28)
where  is the depreciation rate.
Banking Sector The banks’ equity value is accumulated through retained earnings:
et+1 = (1   t)et + [RL
t+1Lt+1(1   F(!b))
+(1   )
Z !b
0
!Rk
t+1qtKt+1f(!)d!   R
f
t+1Lt+1] + wb
t
15where t is the bank default rate, which will be explained in the bank regulation section. Ag-
gregate bank equity at time t+1 consists of three parts: (1 t)et is equity from those banks who
did not default at time t; the term inside the square bracket is unexpected gains or losses in the
loan portfolio; wb
t is bankers’ wages.
Substituting equation (6) into the above equation, we get:
et+1 = (1   t)et + RL
t+1Lt+1(F(!a)   F(!b))
+(1   )
Z !b
0
!Rk
t+1qtKt+1f(!)d!
 (1   )
Z !a
0
!EtRk
t+1qtKt+1f(!)d! + wb
t
Notice from the ﬁnancial contract, we have derived following relationship between loan default
threshold and aggregate capital return:
!b
t+1 =
!a
t+1EtRk
t+1
Rk
t+1
(1.29)
Consider the case when a contractionary shock hits the economy, which reduces realized
capital return Rk
t+1 below the expected value EtRk
t+1. This will lead to higher ex-post loan
default threshold !b
t+1 than expected !a
t+1, correspondingly higher loan default rate F(!b)
than anticipated F(!a), and creat unexpected losses RL
t+1Lt+1(F(!a)   F(!b)) that write down
bank’s capital position. This is the key difference of our model from the original BGG model in
terms of shocks transmission. In the BGG setting, all aggregate shocks are absorbed by ﬁrms’
balance sheets; while in our model, aggregate shocks are absorbed partly by ﬁrms’ balance
sheets and partly by banks’ balance sheets via the ﬁnancial contract.
Given the aggregate loan size, Lt, and bank equity, we obtain the aggregate capital ratio:
t =
et
Lt
(1.30)
The rest of bank funding
dt = Lt   et (1.31)
will be collected from the households in the form of deposits. Therefore, from an aggregate
level, the opportunity cost of bank funding is a linear combination of cost of bank equity and
cost of deposits, where the proportion of each type of funding varies according to the bank
capital ratio.
R
f
t+1 = tRe
t+1 + (1   t)Rd
t+1 (1.32)
16The respective costs of deposits Rd
t+1 and equity Re
t+1 are derived endogenously from house-
holds’ optimization problem.
Bank regulation In modern banking regulation, capital requirement has become the focal
point.11 Given the implicit or explicit government guarantee on bank deposit, bank capital reg-
ulation is imposed to curb banks’ excessive risk-taking. In 1987, the Basel Committee of Banking
Supervision established the Basel I Accord, which provided a uniform capital standard for all
banks in the member countries. Basel I required the ratio of banks’ capital to risk-weighted as-
sets to amount to a minimum of 8 percent, with at least 50 percent of it being tier 1 capital. By
1993, nearly all of the world’s big banks satisﬁed the Basel capital requirement. Many of them
have been increasing their capital ratio. Figure 1.1 presents a histogram of the risk-based total
capital ratios of U.S. commercial banks in the fourth quarter of 2000. As we can see from the
ﬁgure, capital ratios vary across banks, with most of them between 10 and 11 percent, and very
few below 10 percent.
Figure 1.1: Distribution of Bank Capital Ratio of U.S. Banks in 2000:4
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Motivated by this empirical observation, the capital ratio across banks in the model is as-
sumed to have log-normal distribution. The mode of the distribution is given by the aggregate
capital ratio derived above. i;t log-normal (t;).12 The health of the banking sector as a
11In this paper, bank capital regulation is taken as given, instead of being motivated from a micro
perspective. It could be understood to mean that the threshold requirement is set to keep the government
or the central bank from having to shoulder the burden of massive bank failures.
12The conditional distribution of bank capital ratio could be derived endogenously from the bank eq-
uity accumulation equation. For simplicity, in the simulation only the mean of the distribution is used,
while the variance is assumed constant. As Krusell and Smith (1998) has shown, the behavior of the
17whole will depend largely on the variation of aggregate capital ratio. With a higher aggre-
gate ratio, the distribution moves to the right, and fewer banks will fall short of the 8 percent
threshold and thus default, and vice versa. The default probability is given by the cumulative
distribution function up to the regulatory threshold:13
t = cdf(t;) (1.33)
The higher the default probability, the more it costs banks to raise equity. Therefore, a low
capitalpositiontodaywillleadtohigherequitycostsinthenextperiod. Thisincreaseinfunding
costs will dampen banks’ incentive to supply credit, and reduce aggregate investment.
By contrast, in the BGG model, banks’ funding costs are independent of banks’ capital structure,
and always equal to the risk free rate. In economic downturns, even though large loan losses
lead to a weak capital position, funding costs remain the same, as households do not charge a
risk premium for the increased banking instability; therefore, there is no ampliﬁcation effect of
business cycles from banks.
Retail Sector The retail sector is introduced into the model to motivate sticky prices. We
assume monopolistic competition and Calvo pricing. Retailers purchase the wholesale good
from entrepreneurs at a price equal to its nominal marginal cost and differentiate them at no
cost. They then sell these differentiated retail goods in a monopolistically competitive market.
Let Yt(i) be the quantity of output sold by retailer i, measured in units of wholesale goods, and
let Pt(i) be the nominal price. Total ﬁnal usable goods Yt are the following composite of retail
goods:
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yt(i)( 1)=di
=( 1)
(1.34)
with   1 representing the degree of monopolistic competition. The corresponding price index
is given by
Pt =
Z 1
0
Pt(i)(1 )di
1=(1 )
(1.35)
Following Calvo (1983), in a given period the retailer receives the signal to adjust the price with
probability 1    and otherwise has to maintain the previous price. Let P
t (i) denote the price
set by retailers who are able to change price at t, and Y 
t (i) the demand given this price. The
macroeconomic aggregates can be described almost perfectly using only the mean of the wealth distribu-
tion.
13Since banks that fall below the regulatory threshold cannot make new loans, they exit from the in-
dustry. Note that the default case in this model is benign, i.e. banks default because of bad fundamentals.
Irrational bank runs caused purely by shifts in people’s expectations are not considered here.
18retailer will thus choose this price to maximize future expected discounted real proﬁts, given
by:
maxEt
1 X
k=0
h
kt;k
t+k(i)=Pt+k
i
(1.36)
subject to the demand function
Y 
t+k(i) =

P
t (i)
Pt+k
 
Yt+k (1.37)
where the discount rate t;k = kCt=Ct+k (given assumed log utility in consumption) is the
household intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, which the retailer takes as given. 
t+k is
nominalproﬁtsgivenby(P
t (i) MCt+k)Y 
t+k(i). Theoptimizationproblemyieldsthefollowing
condition:
P
t (i) =

   1
Et
P1
k=0 kt;kMCt+k(i)Y 
t+k(i)=Pt+k
Et
P1
k=0 kt;kYt+k(i)=Pt+k
(1.38)
Given that the share  of retailers do not change their price in period t, the aggregate price
evolves according to:
Pt =

P1 
t 1 + (1   )(P
t )1  1
1  (1.39)
Combining the optimal pricing and the evolution of aggregate price and then log-linearizing,
we obtain a standard Phillips curve where ^ mct represents the real marginal cost gap.
Ett+1 = t   (1   )
1   

^ mct (1.40)
Monetary Policy To facilitate comparison with previous models, we assume a simple rule
according to which the central bank adjusts the current nominal interest rate in response to the
lagged inﬂation rate and the lagged interest rate.
rn
t = rrn
t 1 + t 1 + t (1.41)
1.3 Calibration
In the household utility function,  is chosen so that steady-state labor is 0.3. ' is calibrated so
that the steady-state liquidity premium is 380 bp on an annual basis.  is calibrated at 0.983..
In the aggregate production function, the capital share is 0.33, the share of household labor
is 0.66, the share of entrepreneur labor is 0.00956 and the share of banking labor is 0.00044.
Capital depreciates at 2.5 percent quarterly. Capital adjustment parameter  is calibrated at 2
19based on the estimates in Chirinko (1993).
In the retail sector, the degree of monopolistic competition  is calibrated at 6, which implies
a steady-state mark-up of 20 percent. The Calvo probability that a ﬁrm does not change price
in a given period  is set to 0.75, which implies that prices in the economy are adjusted every
four quarters on average. In monetary policy, the autoregressive coefﬁcient is set to 0.65 and
the coefﬁcient of lagged inﬂation 1.2. These calibrations are standard in the literature.
In the ﬁnancial contract, the monitoring cost parameter  is set to 0.12, following BGG 1999.
The probability that entrepreneurs die in a given period 1   
 is set to 0.019. The variance
of idiosyncratic productivity is set to 0.265. These parameterizations lead to a capital-to-net
worth ratio of 2 (leverage ratio of 0.5), an annual loan default rate of 2.56 percent and an
annual external ﬁnance premium of 180 bp. In the distribution of the bank capital ratio, the
steady-state ratio is calibrated at 10 percent and the variance of the distribution is set to match
a steady-state annual bank default rate of 1 percent. Based on Dimson et al. (2002), Annualized
return on equity is calibrated at 5.8 percent and return on deposit 1 percent.
Based on King and Rebelo (1999), the aggregate productivity shock follows an AR (1) pro-
cess, with a coefﬁcient of 0.9 and a standard deviation of 0.0056.
1.4 Simulation
Technology shocks, monetary policy shocks and ﬁnancial shocks are considered in the simula-
tion. First, the impulse responses to shocks are analyzed; then the model is compared with a
model where the only ﬁnancial friction comes from the credit demand side and with a baseline
model with no ﬁnancial friction. The marginal contributions of the bank capital channel to the
long-run steady state and short-run dynamics are studied.
1.4.1 Technology Shocks
Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3 display impulse responses to a positive technology shock with the
size of one standard deviation. After a positive technology shock, the realized capital return
is higher than expected, leading to lower than expected loan default rate. This generates un-
expected gain on the loan portfolio, which strengthens banks’ capital position. Given the im-
provement in banks’ balance sheets, households expect a lower bank default rate in the next
period and are therefore willing to hold bank capital at lower rates of return. The reduction
20in the cost of funding from the banks’ side expands credit supply and drive up investment in
equilibrium. On the other hand, after a positive technology shock, ﬁrms’ net worth increases
and leverage ratios decline, causing them to face lower agency costs in the credit market and
enabling them to obtain loans at lower external ﬁnance premiums. The positive reaction from
both the credit supply and credit demand side drive up aggregate lending to a large extent,
which implies an investment boom. This raises output, consumption, and asset prices. The
marginal cost of production falls after productivity increases; therefore, inﬂation falls.14
Figure 1.2: Impulse responses to a productivity shock
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14In all the graphs in the simulation part, the X-axis represents the number of quarters after shocks hit
the economy, the Y-axis represents the percentage point deviation from the steady state value.
21Figure 1.3: Impulse responses to a productivity shock
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1.4.2 Monetary Policy Shocks
Figure 1.4 and Figure 1.5 show impulse responses to an unanticipated twenty-ﬁve basis point
increase in the policy rate. After a monetary policy tightening, the cost of deposits rises, bank
credit supply declines, ex-post loan default rate goes up. The unexpected loss in loan portfolio
will write off bank’s capital. The deterioration in banks’ balance sheets will lead households to
demand higher returns for holding bank capital in the next period. The difﬁculty in raising cap-
ital will further depress banks’ credit supply and propagate the monetary policy shock. On the
other hand, the net worth of entrepreneurs falls, the leverage ratio rises. This makes them look
less attractive in the credit market and forces them to pay a higher external ﬁnance premium.
Note that, despite the contraction in both credit supply and credit demand, the aggregate lending rises
for about four to six quarters and then falls. This behavior has been well documented in empirical
22studies. Christiano et al. (1996) argue that "following a contractionary shock to monetary pol-
icy, net funds raised by the business sector increases for roughly a year, and then fall". Recall
aggregate lending is determined by: Lt+1 = qtKt+1   Nt+1. The reason for the temporary in-
crease in the loan amount is that, after a monetary policy tightening, there is contraction in ﬁrm
net worth, capital stock and asset prices. The adjustment speed of capital is low; therefore, the
change in aggregate lending depends on the adjustment speed of net worth and asset prices.
Since at the beginning net worth decreases much faster than the asset price, the ﬁrm has to bor-
row more external funds to ﬁnance a reduced amount of investment. In the following period,
contraction of ﬁrm net worth slows down, while asset price is declining faster, ﬁrm’s external
borrowing therefore goes down. The rest of dynamics are standard: after interest rates are in-
creased, inﬂation and consumption fall. Contraction of investment and consumption reduces
the output level.
Figure 1.4: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock
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23Figure 1.5: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock
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1.4.3 Financial Shocks
Figure 1.6 depicts the model dynamics after a negative shock to bank capital. Assume that there
is an exogenous deterioration of bank’s balance sheet and therefore a sudden drop of bank
capital, possibly due to the burst of an asset price bubble, which leads to larger write-offs of
bank equity compared to the case where asset swing is only driven by fundamental as modeled
in this paper. From the simulation we can see that, a sudden drop of bank’s capital position
leads to strong contraction in bank’s credit supply. We observe a decrease in aggregate lending
and an increase in credit spreads. Tightening of credit market leads to dampened aggregate
investment, which further deteriorates ﬁrm’s balance sheet, loan default rate goes up. Weak
aggregate demand leads to both low output and inﬂation.
24Figure 1.6: Impulse responses to a ﬁnancial shock
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1.4.4 Model Comparison: Marginal Effect of Banking Instability
Next, we compare this model with a model where only the BGG type of ﬁnancial friction exists
as well as with a standard model with no ﬁnancial friction. The results show that banking in-
stability can lead to lower capital stock and investment in the long run and have an acceleration
effect on the short-run dynamics of the model.
Long-run effect Table 1 displays steady states of model economy with different frictions. In
the long run, instability of the banking sector implies higher bank funding cost, compared to the
risk-free rate in BGG model. Given the increased funding cost, banks are only willing to ﬁnance
project with higher return. Since the marginal return on capital is decreasing at the aggregate
level, this implies a lower capital stock in the equilibrium, and therefore lower investment,
output and consumption level.
25Table 1.1: Steady States Comparison
Variable Zhang BGG
Capital 7.1621 7.4116
Investment 0.17905 0.1853
Output 0.86509 0.875
Consumption 0.68604 0.68964
Short-run effect Figure 1.7 and Figure 1.8 compare the relative importance of various
frictions in shock transmission. The dashdot line describes impulse responses in a standard
DSGE model, where only nominal rigidity and capital adjustment costs are considered. The
dashed line incorporates the additional friction coming from the credit demand side, or the
ﬁnancial accelerator effect. The solid line captures the model dynamics where the bank capital
channel is added to the previous frictions.
Figure 1.7: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock
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26Figure 1.8: Impulse responses to a productivity shock
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As we can see from the ﬁgures, the bank capital channel has a strong acceleration and
propagation effect on both the impulse responses to the technology shock and the monetary
policy shock. Compared to previous literature (e.g. Markovic (2006)), where the bank capital
channel can generate the acceleration effect, but very little propagation effect, as the marginal
contribution of credit supply friction vanishes after around 8 quarters following a policy shock.
In this model, by introducing bank capital as a state variable, low capital position not only
ampliﬁes the cycle, but also creates more persistence of cycles. This corresponds to the real
world scenario, where after a one-time deterioration of banks’ balance sheets, it takes time to
repair the balance sheets and restore credit supply.
The most signiﬁcant effect of bank capital is on investment, asset prices, and credit spreads.
The instability in the banking sector introduces extra volatility to these variables, while its
impact on output is relatively minor. This is because consumption, which accounts for 80
percent of output in the model calibration, is not strongly subject to the inﬂuence of banking
instability. If consumer loan is incoporated, bank capital channel will have a much larger effect
on the consumption level, and therefore a more signiﬁcant impact on output.
Another observation from Figure 1.7 is that the bank capital channel is more important than
27the ﬁnancial accelerator in amplifying policy shocks. This is consistent with previous ﬁndings
in the literature that the ﬁnancial accelerator contributes only marginally to monetary policy
transmission. However, the relative importance of the two channels is reversed when a positive
technology shock hits the economy, where strong corporate balance sheets play an important
role in driving up asset prices and aggregate investment.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper extends a general equilibrium model with a BGG-type ﬁnancial accelerator to
a model in which ﬁnancial friction coming from both the credit supply and credit demand
sides are considered. By integrating a ﬁnancial contract, in which entrepreneurs and banks
share aggregate risk, aggregate shocks will have impact not only on ﬁrms’ balance sheet,
but also banks’ balance sheet. In economic downturn, in addition to credit demand fric-
tion induced by low ﬁrm net worth, this paper shows that low bank capital position also
creates strong credit supply friction, and leads the economy to contract further. This bank bal-
ance sheet to credit market linkage has been shown to be critical importance in the current crisis.
The extended model enables us to study how real shocks, e.g., technology shocks, monetary
shocks, affect the ﬁnancial sector and how shocks originate in the banking sector can inﬂuence
the real economy. The model also facilitate us to understand the role of different frictions in
shock transmissions.
In future research, this model could be extended to consumer loans. Since consumption is
the major component of output, once the feedback from banking instability to consumption is
incorporated, the effect on output will be much more signiﬁcant compared to the corporate-
loans-only case. The model could also be extended to an open economy and study how the
instability of a ﬁnancial intermediary in one country could inﬂuence the real sector in the other
economy.
28Table 1.2: Notation of key variables
Symbol Variable
K Capital
I Investment
Y Output
C Consumption
d Bank deposit
e Bank equity
N Firm net worth
q Asset price
L Loan
Rk Gross return on capital
Rd Gross return on bank deposit
Re Gross return on bank equity
RL Contractual loan rate
 Bank default rate
F(!a) Expected loan default rate
F(!b) Realized loan default rate
292 Monetary Policy and Asset Prices: the Role of Banking
Instability
This chapter studies optimal Taylor-type monetary policy rules based on the model developed
in the ﬁrst chapter, where the role of bank balance sheets in business cycles is incorporated
into a canonical DSGE framework. We ﬁnd that with interest rate smoothing, ’leaning against
the wind’ can signiﬁcantly dampen the procyclicality of ﬁnancial distortion, and increase the
welfare of the economy.
2.1 Introduction
The ﬁnancial crisis that started in 2007 has triggered a heated debate among academics
and policy makers about the appropriate stance of monetary policy regarding asset price
movement. Many have argued that the focus on goods price inﬂation has made central banks
place insufﬁcient weight on credit and asset prices in interest rate setting, which plays an
non-negligible role in the buildup to the current crisis, In turn, this has led many to argue
that concern for macro ﬁnancial stability be explicitly included in central banks’ mandates. In
its World Economic Outlook 2008, the International Monetary Fund has argued that strong
monetary reaction to an overheating of credit and asset prices can bring stabilization beneﬁts.
Frankel (2009) also argues that narrow inﬂation targeting has already seen its best days and
ﬁghting asset bubbles is the way ahead. On the other hand, there is a long and established
view that inﬂation-targeting central banks need not respond to asset prices, except insofar as
they affect the inﬂation forecast. The Federal Reserve Board has consistently shared this view
and excluded asset price from monetary policy decision. Former Chairman Alan Greenspan
has emphasized the immense difﬁculty of identifying asset price bubbles and pointed out it
is enough for central banks to cut interest rate after the bubble bursts to protect the economy.
Apparently, the painful adjustment caused by the current crisis, despite aggressive monetary
stimulus, has challenged this view.
In the literature, the divergence of view regarding ’leaning against the wind’ has been
long-standing. Current Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke has argued (Bernanke and Gertler (1999,
2001)) that conditional on a strong policy response to inﬂation, gearing monetary policy to
asset prices brings little additional gains in terms of stabilizing the economy. Their conclusion
is drawn by maximizing output-inﬂation volatility frontier on a simulated economy that
emphasizes credit friction. Faia and Monacelli (2007) conducts welfare-based policy analysis on
30a similar structural model and also concludes that the marginal welfare gain of responding to
asset prices vanishes given a strong anti-inﬂationary stance. On the other hand, Cecchetti et al.
(2000, 2002) argue that monetary policy should attempt to identify and respond to asset price
misalignments. Fukunnaga and Saito (2009) similarly argue that if asset prices movements are
closely related to ﬁnancial market imperfection, there maybe potential beneﬁt in responding to
asset price.
This paper seeks to add to this literature by exploring whether and how our answer would
change if banking instability is incorporated into the structural model. Previous studies have
conducted optimal policy in different Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) frame-
works. Although some have built credit frictions into the model, e.g. ’ﬁnancial accelerator’
in Bernanke and Gertler (2001), none of previous studies have allowed for banking stability,
and the role of bank balance sheet on business cycles, which have played an important role
in the current crisis. The analysis in this paper is based on the structural model developed in
Zhang (2009), where the credit market is characterized by both demand and supply frictions.
While credit demand frictions capture how ﬁrms’ ability to borrow relates to their net worth;
credit supply frictions refer to how banks’ willingness to lend depends on its capital position,
or ﬁnancial structure. Given the presence of credit frictions, ﬂuctuation in asset price are
ampliﬁed, and leads to larger ﬂuctuation on ﬁrms’ and banks’ balance sheets, and reinforce the
volatility of the degree of ﬁnancial friction. In short, the new channel compared to previous
study is the link between asset prices and bank balance sheets, as large swing in asset prices
lead to a higher degree of banking instability and turbulence in ﬁnancial markets, which is
detrimental to welfare.
Another highlight of the paper is methodological. In most of previous studies of asset
prices and monetary policy, policy rules are compared based on an output-inﬂation volatility
frontier. This type of unconditional welfare criteria ignores the welfare effects of transitioning
from the initial state to the stochastic steady state induced by the policy. Kim and Kim (2003)
and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) have shown that absence of transitional dynamics may
distort the ranking of alternative policy rules. This paper therefore chooses the conditional
life time utility of households as the welfare measure. Secondly, most of previous analysis are
based on a ﬁrst-order approximation of the economic system and require the assumption that
steady state of the economy is efﬁcient. However, for an economy charaterized by high degree
31of ﬁnancial distortion, the steady state is signiﬁcantly lower than the friction-free economy15.
Follow the method developed in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007), this paper approximates the
original model to second order, which allows us to study policy rules in a dynamic economy
that evolves around an inefﬁcient steady state. The main ﬁndings of the paper are threefold:
First, with interest rate smoothing, responding to asset price is strictly welfare improving
regardless whether the central bank has a strong or weak stance on inﬂation; second, the
additional welfare gain is smaller but still signiﬁcant if strong reaction to output is included
in the policy rule; Third, without interest rate smoothing, too strong reaction to asset prices
may lead to model indeterminacy. These results are in contrast with previous ﬁndings that
conditional on strong anti-inﬂation stance, responding to asset price has marginal welfare gain.
The reason is that once the link between asset prices and banking instability is incorporated
into the model, high volatility of asset prices leads to banking instability, which spills over to
the real economy, therefore amplifying and propagating business cycles. It is therefore crucial
for central banks to ’lean against the wind’ to dampen the procyclicality of ﬁnancial distortions
and their impact on real economy.
The rest of the paper is as follows, Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes the
calibration and solution strategy. Section 4 discusses the implication of bank capital channel on
model dynamics. Section 5 analyzes the welfare effect of alternative interest rate rules. Section
6 concludes.
2.2 Model
The model is discussed here brieﬂy; for a more detailed discussion, please see Zhang (2009).
The economy is inhabited by four types of agents: households, entrepreneurs, retailers and
bankers. The structure of the basic model is the following: Bankers raise equity and deposits
from households, and intermediate these funds to the entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs combine
their own net worth and the money they borrowed from banks to purchase physical capital,
which is used in aggregate production together with labor supplied by households. The
product will then be differentiated in the retail sector to become ﬁnal goods, which are either
invested or consumed by the agents. Nominal return on risk-free assets (i.e., deposit) is set by
the central bank, who conducts monetary policy following a Taylor rule. Banks are subject to a
minimum capital ratio.
15See Zhang (2009) for a comparison of steady states with different frictions.
32Next, we will present a ﬁnancial contract where borrowers and lenders share aggregate risk,
and then integrate it into a general equilibrium.
2.2.1 The Financial Contract
In this part, we discuss the design of an optimal ﬁnancial contract between entrepreneurs and
banks, which is the key deviation of our model from the original BGG model. The contract is
derived in a partial equilibrium setting, taking the price of capital goods, entrepreneurs’ net
worth, the cost of deposits and bank capital as given. We then imbed the optimal contract in
general equilibrium.
There are two parties to the contract: an entrepreneur with net worth and a ﬁnancial
intermediary, which we call "bank". Banks take deposits from and issue equity to households
to ﬁnance the loan demanded by entrepreneurs. We will discuss the detail of the banking
sector later. Both parties are assumed to be risk-neutral. At the end of period t, a continuum
of entrepreneurs (indexed by i 2 (0;1)) need to purchase capital for production at t + 1. The
quantity of capital purchased by entrepreneur i is denoted Ki
t+1. The price of capital in period t
is qt (in real term). The return on capital is subject to both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. The
ex-post gross return to entrepreneur i is !i
t+1Rk
t+1, where !i
t+1 is an idiosyncratic productivity
shock to entrepreneur i, and Rk
t+1 is the ex-post aggregate rate of return on capital. !i
t+1 is
identically and independently distributed (across time and entrepreneurs) with log-normal
distribution and unit mean.
To ﬁnance the purchase of capital, entrepreneurs use internal funds (net worth) and borrow
the rest from a bank. Let Ni
t+1 denote the net worth of entrepreneur i at the end of period of t;
then borrows from the bank is the following:
Li
t+1 = qtKi
t+1   Ni
t+1 (2.1)
!i
t+1 is private information to entrepreneur i and the bank has to pay a monitoring cost to ob-
serve it. Entrepreneurs observe the realization of !i
t+1 and decide whether to repay the debt or
default. If they repay the debt, they pay RL
t+1Lt+1. RL
t+1 is the gross loan rate speciﬁed in the
contract that the entrepreneur needs to pay to the bank. It can be ﬁxed or state-contingent. If
they default, the bank seizes the entrepreneur’s remaining assets after paying the monitoring
cost.16 For a particular value of RK
t+1, there is a corresponding cut-off value of idiosyncratic
16see Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) .
33productivity !i
t+1, such that, if the realization of the idiosyncratic productivity falls below it, the
entrepreneur defaults. That is:
!i
t+1Rk
t+1qtKi
t+1 = RL
t+1Li
t+1 (2.2)
The monitoring cost is assumed to equal a proportion  of the realized gross capital return
!i
t+1Rk
t+1qtKi
t+1. Parameter  captures the degree of monitoring cost or information asymmetry.
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In BGG, entrepreneurs are assumed to bear all the aggregate risk. By issuing state-
contingent loan contract, banks are insulated from aggregate shocks and always obtain risk-free
rate of return on loan portfolios . The optimal contract, as a result, maximizes the expected
return to entrepreneurs as following:
maxEt
(Z 1
!i
t+1
!i
t+1Rk
t+1qtKi
t+1f(!i
t+1)d!   (1   F(!i
t+1))!i
t+1Rk
t+1qtKi
t+1
)
(2.3)
where expectations are taken with respect to the random variable Rk
t+1, and !i
t+1 is a function
of realization of Rk
t+1 (and therefore, function of the states). f(.) and F(.) are respectively the
density function and the cumulative distribution function of the random variable !. The opti-
mal contract must observe the participation constraints of the bank as well, such that, for each
possible realization of states of nature (and therefore, Rk
t+1 and !i
t+1) the contract satisﬁes:
(1   F(!i
t+1))RL
t+1Li
t+1 + (1   )
Z !i
t+1
0
!EtRk
t+1qtKi
t+1f(!)d! = R
f
t+1Li
t+1 (2.4)
In equation (4), the left hand side shows that banks’ return on the loan portfolio has two
components: the loan amount that is paid back by the entrepreneurs, and, in the default case,
the acquisition of the ﬁrm’ remaining assets after paying off the monitoring cost. R
f
t+1 is the
funding cost of the bank, which will be determined in the general equilibrium. Since the
participation constraints hold for each realization of Rk
t+1, banks face no uncertainty in the
return on loan portfolio, which equals to the risk-free rate.
The risk-sharing rule among entrepreneurs and banks is a bit stylized, nonetheless.18 In
reality, banks face great uncertainty in their loan portfolio. The major source of uncertainty is
17The existence of the banking sector in this paper is taken as given. It could also be motivated by
assuming that banks have information advantage compared to households in monitoring the project
outcome, i.e. bank < households.
18See footnote 10 in their paper.
34shocks to default risk. To account for this, we assume that aggregate risk is shared between banks
and entrepreneurs. The ﬁnancial contract cannot be therefore contingent on the realized capital return
but has to be written based on the two parties’ expectation of capital return in the next period.19 Under
this risk sharing rule, we have to make a distinction between the ex-post loan default threshold
!
i;b
t+1 and the ex-ante !
i;a
t+1.
Let EtRk
t+1 denote the expected capital return at the end of period t. We assume that the
entrepreneur can only offer the contract based on EtRk
t+1 instead of all possible realizations of Rk
t+1.
20The contract maximizes the expected return of the entrepreneur as following:
Z 1
!
i;a
t+1
!i
t+1EtRk
t+1qtKi
t+1f(!i
t+1)d!   (1   F(!
i;a
t+1))!
i;a
t+1EtRk
t+1qtKi
t+1 (2.5)
where !
i;a
t+1 is the cut-off idiosyncratic productivity that the entrepreneur is expected to default
in period t+1 based on information up to period t. Correspondingly, the participation constraint
of banks is also based on EtRk
t+1 :
(1   F(!
i;a
t+1))RL
t+1Li
t+1 + (1   )
Z !
i;a
t+1
0
!i
t+1EtRk
t+1qtKi
t+1f(!i
t+1)d! = R
f
t+1Li
t+1 (2.6)
By solving the contract we obtain the credit demand equation (see Appendix A ):
EtRk
t+1 = S(
qtKi
t+1
Ni
t+1
)R
f
t+1 (2.7)
The property and interpretation of S(.) is identical to BGG, where S denotes the external ﬁnance
premium, which captures the wedge (driven by the existence of monitoring cost) between the
cost of ﬁnance from the ﬁrm’s side and the cost of funds from the bank’s side. S0> 0, implying
that the higher is the leverage ratio of ﬁrms, the higher is the external ﬁnance premium.
After solving the optimal contract, the contractual lending rate could be derived as
RL
t+1 =
!
i;a
t+1EtRk
t+1qtKi
t+1
Li
t+1
(2.8)
19A state-contingent contract could be prevented by assuming that the state of the economy is not
observed by the enforcement of the contract, but only observed at the very end of the period when people
form expectations for the next period.
20Our assumption actually simpliﬁes the characterization of the ﬁnancial contract, as it corresponds to
the problem of solving one case of no aggregate risk in the original BGG.
35Note that in this model the contractual lending rate is ﬁxed and independent to the realizations
of the return on capital in t+1, whereas in BGG the lending rate is state-contingent:
RL
t+1 =
!i
t+1Rk
t+1qtKi
t+1
Li
t+1
(2.9)
In period t+1, given the speciﬁed loan rate RL
t+1 and the realized return on capital, the ex-
post default threshold !i;b is now determined by:
!
i;b
t+1 =
RL
t+1Li
t+1
Rk
t+1qtKi
t+1
(2.10)
Recall that the expected default threshold is deﬁned by:
!
i;a
t+1EtRk
t+1qtKi
t+1 = RL
t+1Li
t+1 (2.11)
This implies:
!
i;b
t+1 =
!
i;a
t+1EtRk
t+1
Rk
t+1
(2.12)
From this expression, we see that any deviation of the realized capital return from expected
one will drive a wedge between ex-post loan default rate and ex-ante. We will discuss its impact
on banking sector and aggregate economy later.
2.2.2 General Equilibrium
In this section, we analyze how aggregate shocks can inﬂuence ﬁrm and bank’s balance sheet
via the ﬁnancial contract in a general equilibrium. In addition to a ﬁrm’s credit demand curve
which is contingent on its net worth ( capturing the traditional ﬁnancial accelerator effect), this
model also derives an implicit credit supply curve, which is contingent on bank’s capital posi-
tion.
Households There is a continuum of households in the economy, each indexed by i 2 (0;1).
They consume the ﬁnal good, ct, invest in risk free bank deposits, dt+1, and bank equity, et+1,
supply labor ht and own shares in a monopolistically competitive sector that produces differen-
tiated varieties of goods. The households maximize the utility function:21
maxEt
1 X
k=0
k[ln(ct+k) +
d
1+'
t+k+1
1 + '
+ ln(1   ht+k)] (2.13)
21Inserting deposits into the utility function is just a modeling device to capture the bank’ liquidity
creation function. Model dynamics are robust if we consider a standard utility function with only con-
sumption and leisure.
36subject to the sequence of budget constraints:
dt+1 + et+1 + ct = wtht + Rd
tdt + Re
t(1   t)et + t (2.14)
dt+1 and et+1 are deposits and bank equity(in real terms) held by the household from t to t+1.
Rd
t and Re
t reﬂect the gross real return on holding deposit and bank equity, and t is the default
rate on bank capital. ht is household labor supply, wt is the real wage for household labor, t is
dividends received from ownership of retail ﬁrms. Following Van den Heuvel (2008), the liquid-
ity services of bank deposits are modeled by assuming that the household has a derived utility
function that is increasing in the amount of deposits. The households’ optimization problem
yields following ﬁrst-order conditions:
Uc(ct) = EtRe
t+1(1   t+1)Uc(ct+1) (2.15)
Uc(ct)   Ud(dt+1) = EtRd
t+1Uc(ct+1) (2.16)
 Uc;t=Uh;t = wt (2.17)
Equation (15) shows that households’ intertemporal consumption decisions are determined by
the default-adjusted return on holding bank equity. Equation (16) shows the optimality con-
dition on bank deposit. Equation (17) describes the usual trade-off between consumption and
leisure. In the model set up, bank equity has to offer higher return than deposit for two reasons:
the ﬁrst is the liquidity premium, since deposits can provide households extra utility in addi-
tion to carry a monetary reward; the second is to compensate for the default risk. As will be
discussed later, banks will be shut down and default on capital return when their capital ratios
fall below the regulatory threshold.22
Entrepreneurs Other than difference in the ﬁnancial contract, the entrepreneur sector at the
aggregate level is identical to the BGG. We describe the entrepreneur sector for completeness
purpose below. After signing the ﬁnancial contract, entrepreneurs combine loans acquired from
the bank and their own net worth to purchase capital. They use capital and labor to produce
wholesale goods and sell them on a perfect competitive market at a price equal to their nominal
marginal cost. The aggregate production function is given by :
Yt = AtKk
t (ht)h(he
t)e(hb
t)b (2.18)
22This paper assumes a relationship between households and bankers as delegated monitoring. There-
fore, households do not care about the capital structure of banks in their decision.
37Following BGG, We assumed entrepreneurs and bankers supply one unit of labor services
inelastically to the general labor market: he
t = hb
t = 1. As will be shown later, e and b are
calibrated so that these two additional labor forces have a negligible effect on the output level
and model dynamics.23
The optimization problem of production remains standard:
zt = kmct
Yt
Kt
(2.19)
wt = hmct
Yt
ht
(2.20)
we
t = emct
Yt
he
t
(2.21)
wb
t = bmct
Yt
hb
t
(2.22)
where zt is the real rental rate of capital and wt,we
t and wb
t are, respectively, the real wage of
households, entrepreneurs and bankers. mct denotes real marginal cost. The expected return
on capital is then:
EtRk
t+1 = Et

zt+1 + (1   )qt+1
qt

(2.23)
The accumulation of entrepreneurs’ net worth consists of two parts: proﬁts from operating
the ﬁrms and labor income. It is assumed that, in every period, entrepreneur will die with the
probability 1   
. This assumption ensures that entrepreneurs never accumulate enough net
worth to ﬁnance a project without external ﬁnancing. Those entrepreneurs who die at time t
will consume (1   
)Vt. The evolution of aggregate net worth is therefore given by:
Nt+1 = 
Vt + we
t (2.24)
where Vt represents gross return on operating business. It is the difference between gross
capital return and loan payment.
Vt =
Z 1
!b
!Rk
t+1qtKt+1f(!)d!   (1   F(!b))RL
t+1Li
t+1 (2.25)
23The salary that bankers earn from labor supply could be understood as fee income collected from
transaction services, a function of ﬁnancial intermediaries that is not modeled in the paper.
38Capital Producers Capital producers purchase a fraction of ﬁnal goods from the retailer as
investment goods it and combine this with the existing capital stock to obtain capital stock in
the next period. A quadratic capital adjustment cost is included to motivate a variable price of
capital, which contributes to the volatility of ﬁrm net worth and bank capital. Capital producers
will choose the quantity of investment goods to maximize proﬁt subject to the adjustment cost:
maxEt
"
qtit   it  

2

it
kt
  
2
kt
#
(2.26)
where qt is the real price of capital. The optimization problem yields the following capital sup-
ply curve:
qt = 1 + (
it
kt
  ) (2.27)
where  captures the sensitivity of capital price to investment ﬂuctuation. The higher  is, the
more volatile the price of capital. The aggregate capital stock evolves according to:
kt+1 = it + (1   )kt (2.28)
where  is the depreciation rate.
Banking Sector The banks’ equity value is accumulated through retained earnings:
et+1 = (1   t)et + [RL
t+1Lt+1(1   F(!b))
+(1   )
Z !b
0
!Rk
t+1qtKt+1f(!)d!   R
f
t+1Lt+1] + wb
t (2.29)
where t is the bank default rate, which will be explained in the bank regulation section. Ag-
gregate bank equity at time t+1 consists of three parts: (1 t)et is equity from those banks who
did not default at time t; the term inside the square bracket is unexpected gains or losses in the
loan portfolio; wb
t is bankers’ wages.
Substituting equation (6) into the above equation, we get:
et+1 = (1   t)et + RL
t+1Lt+1(F(!a)   F(!b)) + (1   )
Z !b
0
!Rk
t+1qtKt+1f(!)d!
 (1   )
Z !a
0
!EtRk
t+1qtKt+1f(!)d! + wb
t (2.30)
Notice from the ﬁnancial contract, we have derived following relationship between loan default
threshold and aggregate capital return:
!b
t+1 =
!a
t+1EtRk
t+1
Rk
t+1
(2.31)
39Consider the case when a contractionary shock hits the economy, which reduces realized
capital return Rk
t+1 below the expected value EtRk
t+1. This will lead to higher ex-post loan
default threshold !b
t+1 than expected !a
t+1, correspondingly higher loan default rate F(!b)
than anticipated F(!a), and creat unexpected losses RL
t+1Lt+1(F(!a)   F(!b)) that write down
bank’s capital position. This is the key difference of our model from the original BGG model in
terms of shocks transmission. In the BGG setting, all aggregate shocks are absorbed by ﬁrms’
balance sheets; while in our model, aggregate shocks are absorbed partly by ﬁrms’ balance
sheets and partly by banks’ balance sheets via the ﬁnancial contract.
Given the aggregate loan size, Lt, and bank equity, we obtain the aggregate capital ratio:
t =
et
Lt
(2.32)
The rest of bank funding
dt = Lt   et (2.33)
will be collected from the households in the form of deposits. Therefore, from an aggregate
level, the opportunity cost of bank funding is a linear combination of cost of bank equity and
cost of deposits, where the proportion of each type of funding varies according to the bank
capital ratio.
R
f
t+1 = tRe
t+1 + (1   t)Rd
t+1 (2.34)
The respective costs of deposits Rd
t+1 and equity Re
t+1 are derived endogenously from house-
holds’ optimization problem.
Bank regulation In modern banking regulation, capital requirement has become the focal
point.24 Given the implicit or explicit government guarantee on bank deposit, bank capital
regulation is imposed to curb banks’ excessive risk-taking. In 1987, the Basel Committee
of Banking Supervision established the Basel I Accord, which provided a uniform capital
standard for all banks in the member countries. Basel I required the ratio of banks’ capital to
risk-weighted assets to amount to a minimum of 8 percent, with at least 50 percent of it being
tier 1 capital.
24In this paper, bank capital regulation is taken as given, instead of being motivated from a micro
perspective. It could be understood to mean that the threshold requirement is set to keep the government
or the central bank from having to shoulder the burden of massive bank failures.
40In the model, the capital ratio across banks is assumed to have log-normal distribution. The
mode of the distribution is given by the aggregate capital ratio derived above. i;t log-normal
(t;).25 The health of the banking sector as a whole will depend largely on the variation
of aggregate capital ratio. With a higher aggregate ratio, the distribution moves to the right,
and fewer banks will fall short of the 8 percent threshold and thus default, and vice versa.
The default probability is given by the cumulative distribution function up to the regulatory
threshold:26
t = cdf(t;) (2.35)
The higher the default probability, the more it costs banks to raise equity. Therefore, a low
capitalpositiontodaywillleadtohigherequitycostsinthenextperiod. Thisincreaseinfunding
costs will dampen banks’ incentive to supply credit, and reduce aggregate investment.
By contrast, in the BGG model, banks’ funding costs are independent of banks’ capital structure,
and always equal to the risk free rate. In economic downturns, even though large loan losses
lead to a weak capital position, funding costs remain the same, as households do not charge a
risk premium for the increased banking instability; therefore, there is no ampliﬁcation effect of
business cycles from banks.
Retail Sector The retail sector is introduced into the model to motivate nominal rigidity.
Monopolistic competition and quadratic price adjustment costs are assumed. Let Yt(i) be the
quantity of output sold by retailer i, measured in units of wholesale goods, and let Pt(i) be the
nominal price. Total ﬁnal usable goods Yt are the following composite of retail goods:
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yt(i)( 1)=di
=( 1)
(2.36)
with   1 representing the degree of monopolistic competition. The corresponding price index
is given by
Pt =
Z 1
0
Pt(i)(1 )di
1=(1 )
(2.37)
25The conditional distribution of bank capital ratio could be derived endogenously from the bank eq-
uity accumulation equation. For simplicity, in the simulation only the mean of the distribution is used,
while the variance is assumed constant. As Krusell and Smith (1998) has shown, the behavior of the
macroeconomic aggregates can be described almost perfectly using only the mean of the wealth distribu-
tion.
26Since banks that fall below the regulatory threshold cannot make new loans, they exit from the in-
dustry. Note that the default case in this model is benign, i.e. banks default because of bad fundamentals.
Irrational bank runs caused purely by shifts in people’s expectations are not considered here.
41Assume retailers face a quadratic adjustment cost when setting price:
#
2
(
Pt(i)
Pt 1(i)
  )2Pt (2.38)
The retailer will maximize future expected discounted real proﬁts, given by:
maxEt
1 X
t=0
[0;t
t(i)=Pt] (2.39)
subject to the demand function
Yt(i) =

Pt(i)
Pt
 
Yt (2.40)
where the discount rate 0;t = tCt=C0 (given assumed log utility in consumption) is the
household intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, which the retailer takes as given. 
t is
nominal proﬁts given by (Pt(i)Yt(i)   PtmctYt(i))   #
2(
Pt(i)
Pt 1(i)   )2Pt. let e pt 
Pt(i)
Pt reprents the
relative price.
The optimization problem yields the following condition:
#t(t
e pt
e pt 1
  )=pt 1(i) = t
Yt
Pt
e pt
 ((1   ) + mct) + #E0t+1(t+1
e pt+1
e pt
  )t+1=pt(i) (2.41)
In a symmetric equilibrium, e pt = 1, we can therefore simply the above equation to the following:
Uc;t(t   )t = Uc;tYt(mct  
   1

)=# + Et fUc;t+1(t+1   )t+1g (2.42)
This is non-linear form of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve where deviation of real marginal
cost from it steady state is driving inﬂation dynamics.
Monetary Policy The model is closed by assuming that interest rate is set according to a
Taylor-type simple rule. The central bank may adjust the current nominal interest rate in re-
sponse to lagged interest rate, current inﬂation rate, output and asset price. Alternative rules
are compared in the welfare evaluation section.
ln(
Rn
t
Rss
) = r ln(
Rn
t 1
Rss
) +  ln(
t
ss
) + y ln(
Yt
Yss
) + q ln(qt) (2.43)
Fiscal Policy Government expenditure is assumed as following:
ln(
Gt
Gss
) = g ln(
Gt 1
Gss
) + 
g
t (2.44)
42Market clearing condition implies:
Yt = Ct + It + Gt + Ce
t +
#
2
(t   )2 + ::: (2.45)
The dotted part in the equation captures the bankruptcy cost of ﬁrms and banks. Since they are
quantitatively very small, therefore dropped in the later simulation.
2.3 Calibration
In the household utility function,  is chosen so that steady-state labor is 0.3. ' is calibrated
so that the steady-state liquidity premium is 380 bp on an annual basis.  is calibrated so that
annual real return on deposit is 2 percent. In the aggregate production function, the capital
share is 0.33, the share of household labor is 0.66, the share of entrepreneur labor is 0.00956
and the share of banking labor is 0.00044. Capital depreciates at 2.5 percent quarterly. Capital
adjustment parameter  is calibrated at 2 based on the estimates in Chirinko (1993). In the retail
sector, the degree of monopolistic competition  is calibrated at 6, which implies a steady-state
mark-up of 20 percent. The price rigidity parameter # is calibrated so that the linearized version
of the phillips curve corresponds to calvo probability of 0.75.
In the ﬁnancial contract, the monitoring cost parameter  is set to 0.12, following Bernanke
et al. (1999). The probability that entrepreneurs die in a given period 1   
 is set to 0.019.
The variance of idiosyncratic productivity is set to 0.265. These parameterizations lead to the
following steady-state values: a capital-to-net worth ratio of 2 (leverage ratio of 0.5), an annual
loan default rate of 2.56 percent and an annual external ﬁnance premium of 180 bp. In the
distribution of the bank capital ratio, the steady-state ratio is calibrated at 10 percent and the
variance of the distribution is set to match a steady-state bank default rate of 1 percent.
Based on King and Rebelo (1999), the aggregate productivity shock follows an AR (1)
process, with a coefﬁcient of 0.9 and a standard deviation of 0.0056. The AR(1) coefﬁcient
in government expenditure is set to 0.9, standard deviation of g 0.008. These are based on
estimates in Perotti (2004).
The model is solved by computing a second-order approximation of the policy function
around the deterministic steady state. In contrast to ﬁrst-order approximation, where certainty
equivalence holds, the expected value of a variable always equals to its non-stochastic steady
43state; with second-order approximation, stochastic volatility will have an impact on both the
ﬁrst and second moments of the endogenous variables. This is critical for the welfare analysis
later. For more details on the solution strategy, please see the appendix.
2.4 Welfare Evaluation
2.4.1 Model Dynamics
In this section, we study the dynamic behavior of the model. Especially, we lightlight the role
of bank balance sheet in shaping the equilibrium response in comparison to previous literature
like BGG, where uncertainty in the banking sector is absent.
Figure 2.1 shows impulse responses of the model to a one standard deviation positive tech-
nology shock. The blue line shows dynamics of the model with both ﬁrms’ and banks’ balance
sheet channel, while the green line shows model dynamics where bank balance sheet channel
is absent. After a positive technology shock, the realized capital return is higher than expected,
leading to lower than expected loan default rate. This generates unexpected gain on the loan
portfolio, which strengthens banks’ capital position. Given the improvement in banks’ balance
sheets, households expect a lower bank default rate in the next period and are therefore will-
ing to hold bank capital at lower rates of return. The reduction in the cost of funding from the
banks’ side expands credit supply and drive up investment in equilibrium. On the other hand,
after a positive technology shock, ﬁrms’ net worth increases and leverage ratios decline, caus-
ing them to face lower agency costs in the credit market and enabling them to obtain loans at
lower external ﬁnance premiums. The positive reaction from both the credit supply and credit
demand side drive up aggregate lending to a large extent, which implies an investment boom.
This raises output, consumption, and asset prices. The marginal cost of production falls after
productivity increases; therefore, inﬂation falls.
As we can see from the graph, the bank capital channel has a strong acceleration and
propagation effect on business cycles. This is because in previous models, technology shocks
only reduce the degree of credit friction from the demand side because of higher ﬁrm net
worth; while in this model those shocks also dampen credit supply friction by strengthening
bank capital position.
For details on what are the roles of different frictions in the model dynamics to different
shocks, see Zhang (2009).
44Figure 2.1: Impulse responses to a productivity shock
0 5 10 15 20
−0.05
0
0.05
Output
 
 
Full
Noe
0 5 10 15 20
−0.02
0
0.02
0.04
Consumption
0 5 10 15 20
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Investment
0 5 10 15 20
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Inflation
Note: The X-axis represents the number of quarters after shocks hit the economy, the Y-axis represents
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2.4.2 Welfare Deﬁnition
The object that monetary policy aims to maximize in this paper is the expectation of house-
hold’s life time utility conditonal on the initial state of the economy. This is fundamentally
different from previous studies that rank policy based on unconditional expectations of utility.
As the previous method ignores the welfare effect of transitioning from deterministic steady
states (or any other initial states) to the different stochastic steady states implied by the policy
rule under consideration. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) show that ignoring the transition
effect may result in different ranking of policies than the case with unconditional utility. It is
therefore crucial to choose the right welfare metric.
The structural model in this paper is characterized by heterogeneous agents: households,
entrepreneurs and bankers. Entrepreneurs and banker don’t have utility functions explicitly,
rather they are assumed to rule-of-thumb consumers. This does not affect the welfare analysis.
As both entrepreneurs and bankers are both risk neutral, their utility (whatever form that
would be) will be determined by the mean level of their consumption and unaffected by the
volatility of consumptions. Notice that the mean level of their consumption always equal to
the deterministic steady state and do not vary across different policy rules. This simpliﬁes our
analysis to a great extent. We can therefore do the policy analysis based on the conditional
utility of the household only.
45The conditional welfare is derived as following: ﬁrst, we write the utility of the household
in recursive form:
t = U(ct;dt;lh
t ) +   Ett+1 (2.46)
We than add this equation to the optimality conditions of the model, and take a second-
order approximation of the whole system, then solve the endogenous variables (including the
conditional welfare t) as function of predetermined variables and shocks to the system. See
appendix for detail.
2.4.3 Policy Optimization
In this section, we study the welfare implication of alternative policy rules.
Case 1: With interest rate smoothing and no response to output We ﬁrst consider the
case, where monetary policy does not systematically responds to output gap, i.e.,y = 0. r is
set to 0.65 to capture interest rate smoothing. We then search numerically for the value of 
and q that optimize the conditional welfare.
Figure 2.2: Conditional welfare varying response to inﬂation and to the asset price, with
interest rate smoothing and no response to output
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46Figure 2.2 shows the result. Note that for any given value of  in the search grid, welfare is
strictly increasing in q. This results can be seen more clearly in Figure 2.3, where the marginal
welfare gain of responding to asset price is plot against three different monetary policy stances
against inﬂation: the blue line describes the case with weak anti-inﬂation,  = 1; the green
line is the medium case with  = 2; while the red line represents strong anti-inﬂation policy
with  = 3. We can see that the welfare gain of ’leaning against the wind’ does not vanish
when central bank becomes tougher on anti-inﬂationary stance. This is in contrast with previ-
ous literatures that conclude that responding to asset price does not bring signiﬁcant welfare
improvement conditional on strong response to inﬂation.
Figure 2.3: Conditional welfare varying response to asset price conditional on inﬂation
coefﬁcient, with interest rate smoothing and no response to output
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The difference in conclusions is mainly driven by the underlying ﬁnancial distortions in the
economy. In previous papers that emphasize credit demand friction coming from the ﬁrm side,
inﬂation contains a lot of information regarding the degree of ﬁnancial friction, therefore strong
anti-inﬂation policy also dampens the procyclicality of ﬁnancial friction; while in this paper,
the newly incorporated credit supply friction seems to have less pronounced effect on inﬂation,
which means inﬂation rate could be muted while ﬁnancial distortion is already very high. In
such case, responding to inﬂation rate is not sufﬁcient to dampen ﬁnancial frictions, and central
banks have to turn to more informative indicator: the asset price.
Case 2: With interest rate smoothing and response to output Next we study the case
where output (level) is taken into account in the policy rule. Figure 2.4 shows the simulation
47result with the interest rate smoothing parameter r = 0:65 and response to output y = 0:8.
We can see that responding to asset price is still strictly welfare improving, despite the quan-
titatively gain is not as signiﬁcant as the case with y = 0. The reason is that output contains
more information than inﬂation about the degree of ﬁnancial distortion, therefore responding
to output has dampened the cyclicality of credit friction to some extent. Another observation is
that including output in the policy rule is welfare improving rather than welfare deteriorating
as concluded in Faia and Monacelli (2007), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007).
Figure 2.4: Conditional welfare varying response to inﬂation and to the asset price, with
interest rate smoothing and response to output
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Case 3: With no interest rate smoothing and no response to output In this section,
we consider the case of neither interest rate smoothing nor a response to output in the policy
rule. The degree of response to asset price now matters. As shown in Figure 2.5, in the lower
range of q < 1, welfare is actually decreasing; for 1 < q < 2:5, welfare is strictly increasing in
q. At lower value of , the optimal welfare is better than the case with no response to asset
price, while for strong anti-inﬂation policy, the result is reversed; for q > 2:5, the model does
not have unique local equilibrium. These observations have the following policy implications:
First, over-reacting to asset price movement in setting interest rates may destabilize the econ-
omy; Second, the optimal degree of response to asset price depends on the inﬂation coefﬁcient.
For highly anti-inﬂation central banks, it could be desirable not to respond to asset prices; for
centralbanks withrelatively weakresponse toinﬂation, itis importanttorespond toasset prices
sufﬁciently.
48Figure 2.5: Conditional welfare varying response to inﬂation and to the asset price, with
no interest rate smoothing and no response to output
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2.5 Conclusion
This paper studies whether monetary policy should respond to asset prices if the linkage
between swings of asset price and banking instability is incorporated into structural model.
Taylor-type policy rules are compared based on welfare criteria. The study shows that with
interest rate smoothing, responding to asset price is strictly welfare improving regardless
whether the central bank has a strong or weak stance on inﬂation, although the additional
welfare gain is less pronounced if strong reaction to output is included in the policy rule. On
the other hand, without interest rate smoothing, too strong reaction to asset price may lead to
model indeterminacy.
These results have important policy implications. As the conduct of monetary policy in
most central banks explicitly or implicitly avoids too frequent change of policy rate, or preserve
a relative smooth interest rate path, it seems desirable for central banks to take asset price into
consideration when setting interest rates. With the increasing development of the ﬁnancial
sector, its interconnection with the real economy is also getting stronger. Banking instability is
having more and more inﬂuence on business cycles. It is therefore critical to have systematic
policy that minimize the cyclicality of ﬁnancial distortion and its impact on real economy.
Inthispaper, assetpriceismodeledasdrivenbyfundamentals. Forfutureresearch, itwould
49be interesting to build bubbles into the model and study its policy implications.
503 Household Savings: An Automatic Stabilizer in a Fi-
nancial Crisis?
Following the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, households dramatically and abruptly reduced their con-
sumption and increased their saving. Many argued that such a shock to household savings
would contribute to a deep and prolonged recession. Corporate savings ﬂows — the undis-
tributed proﬁts that are critical for funding new capital expenditures — received less attention.
As the recession began and balance sheets deteriorated, corporate savings fell dramatically. In-
vestment expenditures also fell, but by less. This implies that savings from other sources must
have risen; an important such source was households. Our general equilibrium framework
broadly mimics such stylized facts. By cushioning the fall of investment, household frugality
was thus a stabilizing response by households — not a destabilizing shock.
3.1 Introduction
During the 2008-09 crisis aggregate demand fell dramatically in the US and elsewhere. Figure
3.1 shows output growth and the contribution of household consumption in several industri-
alized countries. Households reduced their consumption and increased their savings. Policy
makers became concerned about household behavior, insofar as lower consumption would
also mean lower economic growth — at least in the very near term. Some, including Blanchard
(2009), noted that lower consumption expenditures would not be replaced by higher private
investment expenditures.
Such events have brought about renewed interest in the Keynesian "Paradox of Thrift"
(POT). According to the POT, an abrupt increase in household saving will have a destabilizing
effect on an economy by reducing aggregate demand. According to some, such a destabilizing
impact will be even more severe if interest rates are downwardly rigid in nominal terms. For
example, Christiano (2004) linked the POT to the liquidity trap, the case wherein the nominal
interest rate is bounded on the downside at zero.
While household frugality may have played a key role in the recent global downturn,
that role may not have been a destabilizing one. The recent economic downturn was in large
part a "balance sheet" recession. It was brought on by a fall of conﬁdence in the ﬁnancial
system and an adverse shock to corporate net worth. Such a shock will be reﬂected in a fall in
corporate proﬁts, including the retained component — corporate savings. Such savings ﬂows
51may be critical for funding for additional capital expenditures. Figure 3.2 shows the changes
in corporate proﬁts and capital expenditures in the same group of industrialized countries. In
most of the countries show, these two variables move closely together - and especially so over
the 2007-09 period. 27
Under such ﬁnancial stress, more thrifty households can help stabilize the economy -
rather than destabilize it (as the POT suggests). As the saving — investment identity shows,
an economy’s private capital investment must equal the sum of domestic corporate savings,
domestic household savings, the government budget surplus, and external savings (the current
account deﬁcit). Data from the US and several other industrialized economies (discussed in
detail later in the paper) suggest that corporate earnings fell substantially – by an average of
5% of GDP.28 Likewise, government budget surpluses also fell substantially - an average of
about 6% of GDP. Capital formation also fell over the cycle – but by substantially less. Total
investment expenditures fell about by about 3.2% of GDP, while the non-residential component
of investment fell only by 1%.
Given the huge drop in corporate earnings, and large government deﬁcit following the
crisis, The evidence suggests that extra households’ savings cushion the free fall of investment.
Owing to a fall in their consumption, savings by household rose by about 1.3% of GDP. The
savings — investment identity suggests a counterfactual: if households had not increased their
savings by as much as they did, and all else had remained constant, investment spending
would have fallen by even more.29
In this paper we examine the interplay between corporate saving, household saving, and
private capital investment during periods of ﬁnancial stress. To do so, we use a general
equilibrium macroeconomic framework, for our analysis, namely Bernanke et al. (1999)
27The charts show the changes in corporate earnings CORPEARN and ﬁxed capital formation I, each
in percent of base year gross domestic product (GDP).
28Our set of countries includes Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands,
Sweden, the U.K. and the U.S. The cycle is deﬁned as peak-to-trough for corporate earnings. While the
precise date differs by country, in most countries corporate earnings peak in mid-to-late 2007 and ﬁnd
their trough in 2009. Our data are calculated as the change in investment, savings, and consumption as
a fraction of base period GDP. Since the change in retained corporate earnings is not reported for most
countries, our proxy is the change in either gross corporate earnings or the gross operating corporate
surplus.
29The data on the remaining source of savings from the external sector is mixed: it increased in some
countries while decreased in others.
52"ﬁnancial accelerator" model (hereinafter BGG). Because the model includes ﬁnancial frictions,
it is well-suited for our analysis. In the model, external corporate ﬁnancing costs fall as the
net worth of the ﬁrm rises. These are deadweight losses: they reﬂect ﬁnancial frictions that
arise from informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. Such costs reﬂect "due
diligence" by ﬁnancial intermediaries.
We model a "balance sheet recession" as an adverse shock to corporate net worth. Such a
shock may reﬂect a fall in ﬁnancial conﬁdence. Such shocks, which may be thought of as asset
’ﬁre sales,’ are not new in macroeconomics or ﬁnance literature, as Shleifer and Vishny (2011)
point out. Seminal papers that discuss such shocks include Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).30
In our model, we follow most of the assumptions in the original BGG paper. The economy
is closed. Entrepreneurs own corporations whose external ﬁnance premium (interest spreads)
falls as corporate net worth rises. When corporate earnings increase, ﬁrms can increase their
net worth and invest more.
Corporate earnings are one key source of domestic savings. Another source is households,
where saving is the difference between household income and total private consumption (en-
trepreneurs plus salaried agents). The public sector surplus is a residual that passively adjusts
to other variables in the economy so as to close the model.31 Monetary policy, summarized by
a Taylor rule, is countercyclical.
Under ﬁnancial stress (an adverse shock to corporate net worth), corporate earnings fall.
Both consumer and investment demand also fall. This reduces inﬂation, but easing by the
central bank (a lower interest rate) limits that fall. For this reason, capital investment falls by
less than corporate earnings (savings). This means that other savings (household plus public)
must rise. Importantly, total household consumption falls; this is an important source of extra
saving.
In our baseline calibration, extra household saving cannot entirely ﬁll this gap. Instead, the
30Other recent papers by Curdia and Woodford (2009) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) consider shocks
to ﬁnancial efﬁciency or ’capital quality.’ We argue that our shock might reﬂect a fall in ﬁrms’ ability to
resell their capital, in the spirit of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
31See Leeper (1991) for the distinction between ’active’ and ’passive’ ﬁscal policy.
53(passive) ﬁscal policy must accommodate by increasing its savings. Of course, we cannot rule
out hypothetical alternative calibrations wherein household savings might rise "too much" so
as to require a decrease in public savings. For this reason, we cannot rule out conditions under
which a Keynesian countercyclical policy might be warranted.
We also present empirical evidence from nine industrialized countries for the 2007-09
period. Investment falls, but by less than corporate savings. Typically, household savings rise -
but modestly so. Household consumption either falls or rises less than income. This conﬁrms a
key implication of the model: during periods of ﬁnancial stress, when corporate earnings fall,
extra household savings help buffer the fall of investment. Also, among industrial countries,
increases in foreign savings (not explicitly considered in our closed economy model) also
helped to cushion the fall of investment in several industrial countries.
Much recent research in macroeconomics has stressed the role of shocks to the ﬁnancial
system. Our work emphasizes that such shocks will have implications for a fundamental
macroeconomic constraint, namely the investment - savings equality. An adverse ﬁnancial
shock will mean that an economy will have fewer resources to invest. Reductions in net worth
imply deadweight costs to the economy - not simply losses on paper. The implications of
household frugality associated with a recession depend critically on whether the shock is
rooted in the ﬁnancial sector or in households themselves (as some traditional frameworks
emphasize). Our work suggests that if the shock is based in the ﬁnancial sector, additional
household frugality may be a stabilizing response that cushions the fall of investment -
not a destabilizing shock. This has implications for ﬁscal responses. While countercyclical
ﬁscal responses might be targeted to helping the most vulnerable households smooth their
consumption streams, the aim of ﬁscal policy should not be simply replace spending and
reduce overall saving. This is always true, but especially so when an economy has suffered a
loss of resources.
The paper is organized as follows. In Part II, we present the model (calibration provided in
an appendix). In Part III we present key impulse responses. In Part IV, we present some cross
country evidence comparing the recent (2007-09) crisis to our model. Part V concludes.
543.2 Model
Our model largely follows BGG (1999). Our contribution lies in reinterpreting that model. Since
the model is well-known we relegate several elements to an appendix.
3.2.1 Production Technology and Aggregate Demand
The economy’s production function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas:
Yt = AtK
t 1(Lt)1  (3.1)
where Yt is current output, Kt 1 is capital installed in the previous period (following the "time-
to-build" assumption), and Lt is the amount of labor currently employed. Labor is supplied by
two types of agents, namely salaried (S) and entrepreneurial (E). Total labor supply is:
Lt = L
S;t(LE;t)1  (3.2)
On the demand side, the national income accounting identity is:
Yt = CS;t + CE;t + It + Gt (3.3)
CS;t and CE;t represent consumption by S and E households respectively, It is investment ex-
penditures, and Gt is government purchases.
3.2.2 The Non-entrepreneurial Sector (salaried households plus government)
Salaried households have two sources of income. They earn a wage WS;t from labor supplied
to entrepreneurs LS;t and they receive asset income (interest paid by banks) (Rt  1)Bt 1 where
Rtis the gross real (risk-free) interest rate. The decision to consume CS;t is the outcome of the
maximization of the utility function:
maxEt
1 X
k=0
k[ln(CS;t+k) +  ln(1   LS;t+k)]
subject to the following budget constraint:
e Bt + CS;t = WS;tLS;t + Zt + Rt e Bt 1 (3.4)
where WS;t is the real wage paid to salaried agents,LS;t is the number of hours they supply,
Rt is the (gross real rate of return) on a risk free asset held by households (discussed later).Zt
55represents implicit proﬁts to a retail sector run by salaried agents net of a lump-sum tax.
The corresponding intertemporal ﬁrst-order (Euler) condition is:
UC(CS;t) = EtRtUC(CS;t+1) (3.5)
Likewise, the ﬁrst order condition for the labor/leisure tradeoff yields a labor supply curve:
 UC(CS;t)=UL(LS;t) = WS;t (3.6)
The government is treated as if it were simply a third class of consumer. Government purchases
yield no utility for households. They have no effect on the household decision to consume
or supply labor, and they are not productive. Following BGG, ﬁscal policy is passive: the
government budget surplus (taxes minus expenditures) passively adjusts so as to accommodate
monetary policy (see below).32
There is one risk-free ﬁnancial instrument: Bt is a risk-free deposit that is lent forward to
entrepreneurs. This occurs implicitly through a banking system. Such deposits are available to
both households and the government. For this reason, it is useful to write a budget constraint
that consolidates salaried households and the public sector:
Bt = RtBt 1 + WS;tLS;t   CS;t + GBSt (3.7)
where GBSt is the (residual) government budget surplus. All saving by non-entrepreneurial
agents (salaried households plus the public sector) is reﬂected one-to-one in the accumulation
of such deposits.
SAVN;t = Bt   Bt 1 = (Rt   1)Bt 1 + WS;tLS;t   CS;t + GBSt (3.8)
3.2.3 The Entrepreneurial Sector
Following BGG, we assume a continuum of entrepreneurial (E) households, indexed by i. In the
aggregate, E households jointly own the economy’s capital stock qK , where q is the familiar
(Tobin) sale price of capital goods and is the physical stock of capital. Optimal capital invest-
ment I and the relative price of capital goods q are jointly determined in the model by supply
32This setup resembles Leeper (1991) deﬁnition of a ’passive’ ﬁscal policy that seems "irrelevant" but
is quite critical insofar as "an equilibrium exists only because ﬁscal behavior supports the prevailing
monetary policy."
56and demand. Capital producing ﬁrms (owned by entrepreneurs) are assumed to maximize their
expected proﬁts:
maxEt
"
qtIt   It  

2

It
Kt
  
2
Kt
#
(3.9)
where  is the capital depreciation rate,

2

It
Kt   
2
reﬂects capital adjustment costs.
The optimization problem yields the following capital supply curve that links Tobin’s q to the
ﬂow of capital expenditures:
qt = 1 + (
It
Kt
  ) (3.10)
The capital stock evolves according to:
Kt+1 = I
t + (1   )Kt (3.11)
To ﬁnance capital accumulation, entrepreneurs rely to some extent on leverage. Their debt
to households (via banks) is Bt. Thus aggregate net worth is Nt = qtKt   Bt.
A key variable for entrepreneurs is the real return to capital:
EtRk
i;t+1 = Et

MPKt+1  MCt+1 + (1   )qt+1
qt

!i
t+1 (3.12)
where MPKt+1 is the marginal product of capital, MCt+1 is the real marginal cost (the relative
price of wholesale goods to retail goods). Equation (3.13) thus summarizes two components of
Rk
t+1: the value of the marginal product of capital and the resale value of capital stock (net of
depreciation).
We follow Gale and Hellwig (1985) discussion of an optimal contract between a bank
(lender) and a ﬁrm (borrower). Each ﬁrm i will experience a random idiosyncratic shock !i
t+1
to its proﬁtability. If the shock equals or exceeds a threshold value (!i
t+1 > !t+1), that ﬁrm is
a successful one (SF). Such a ﬁrm will use its realized capital return to pay back the loan while
keeping the rest as ﬁrm equity. The aggregate value of successful ﬁrms is:
V SF
t+1 =
Z 1
!t
!Rk
t+1qtKt+1f(!)d!   (1   F(!t))RL
t (qtKt   Nt) (3.13)
where F(!t) is the cumulative distribution function of !t, and RL
t is the loan rate.
By contrast, unsuccessful ﬁrms (UF) are those whose idiosyncratic shocks fall below the
threshold value (!i
t+1 < !t+1). These ﬁrms default. Their post-default value is zero: V UF
t+1 = 0
. The bank will seize such a ﬁrm’s remaining equity after paying the monitoring cost, which is
57a ﬁxed proportion  of the realized return. In this case, the bank receives the residual from the
bankrupted ﬁrms
(1   )
Z !t
0
!Rk
t+1qtKtf(!)d! (3.14)
That is, banks pay a ﬁxed portion  of their gross seizure of the liquidated ﬁrms as a monitoring
cost. The parameter  summarizes monitoring costs inherent in a ﬁnancial system, including
the regime of supervision, regulation, and disclosure (see Gale and Hellwig (1985)), Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999) for more discussion); Note also that  implies a
deadweight loss associated with ﬁnancial intermediation. Total deadweight loss DLt for the
economy is:
DLt = 
Z !t
0
!Rk
t+1qtKtf(!)d! (3.15)
Also, under the optimal contract, the expected rate of return on capital must satisfy:
Rt+1(qtKt   Nt) + DLt = EtRk
t+1(qtKt   Nt) (3.16)
That is, loan repayment plus the deadweight loss term must equal the expected net return on
capital.
Following BGG, the law of motion for aggregate net worth (for all E households) is:
Nt+1 = 
(Rk
t+1qtKt   DLt   RtBt) + WE;tLE;t (3.17)
where 
 is the fraction of entrepreneurial resources that is reinvested rather than consumed,
WE;tLE;t is the wage bill paid to entrepreneurs, and RtBt is the amount owed to households
(through banks). Note that the variable 
 summarizes a "rule of thumb" that consumption by E
households is a ﬁxed portion of corporate net worth in any period:
CE;t+1 = (1   
)(Rk
t+1qtKt   DLt   RtBt) (3.18)
3.2.4 The Financial Accelerator
Equations (3.9) through (3.18) yield an investment decision (equilibrium value of I
t ) that takes
into account both the real return to capital and the marginal cost of funds.
The cost of funds largely determined by a central feature of the BGG model, the "ﬁnancial
accelerator" that links the borrowing costs of ﬁrms to their balance sheets. The risk premium
(spread) EtRk
t+1=Rt+1 is:
EtRk
t+1=Rt+1 = s(
qtKt
Nt
) (3.19)
58where s0 > 0. This implies the higher is a ﬁrm’s leverage ratio, the higher is its external ﬁnance
premium.
3.2.5 A Flow of Funds Interpretation
Like any other macroeconomic model, this one respects the savings - investment identity:
It = SAVE;t + SAVN;t (3.20)
where private investment must be either funded by internal sources SAVE;t, or external sources
SAVN;t that are provided by households and government. Equation (3.20) may be rewritten
in a way that is more compatible with actual macroeconomic data. First we consolidate the
consumption of entrepreneurial and salaried households:
Ct = CE;t + CN;t (3.21)
Second, we note that the model includes a measure of retained corporate earnings:
CORPEARNt = (Rk
t+1   1)qtKt   DLt   (Rt   1)Bt (3.22)
Equation (3.22) summarizes the ﬂow of resources available to ﬁnance capital investment that
are internal to the ﬁrm: gross returns on capital minus interest payments and the deadweight
loss. An expanded deﬁnition of private household savings is:
SAVHH;t = YHH;t   Ct = (Rt   1)Bt + WE;tLE;t + WS;tLS;t   Ct (3.23)
Note, in equation (3.23) we have moved two key elements from the corporations to households:
entrepreneurial saving and entrepreneurial consumption. Hence, savings-investment identity
(3.20) may be rewritten as:
It = CORPEARNt + SAVHH;t + GBSt (3.24)
In simulations presented below, an adverse net worth shock will reduce CORPEARNt. At the
same time, since the rate of return on capital will fall, investment must also fall. A key ques-
tion is whether that fall of investment is greater than or less than the fall in corporate earnings
CORPEARNt. The equation shows that if investment falls by less than corporate earnings, the
reason must be that either household savings SAVHH;t,the government budget surplus GBSt,
or both variables, must rise. Moreover, since a fall in household consumption relative to income
will raise SAVHH;t, that fall in household consumption is a stabilizing buffer for investment.
593.2.6 Inﬂation, Monetary Policy, and Fiscal Policy
As in BGG, we assume monopolistic competition and Calvo pricing in the retail sector. The
loglinearize form of the Phillips curve is:( for details, please see chapter 1)
Ett+1 = t   (1   )
1   

^ mct (3.25)
where t is inﬂation,  is the Calvo price adjustment parameter (the probability that prices
will remain sticky in any period), and ^ mct represents the real gap in marginal cost as a percent
deviation from steady state.
A Taylor rule summarizes monetary policy: the central bank adjusts the current nominal
interest rate in response to the lagged inﬂation rate and the lagged interest rate. In log linear
form, that rule is:
rn
t = rrn
t 1 + t 1 + t (3.26)
The nominal interest rate, the real interest rate, and inﬂation are linked according to a Fisher
relationship:
rn
t+1 = rt+1 + Ett+1 (3.27)
Finally, as in BGG, government expenditure follows a simple AR(1) process in the log-
linearized form.
gt = ggt 1 + t (3.28)
a passive ﬁscal policy (choice of GBSt ) closes the model. That is, accommodates the interest
rate — and, implicitly, the equilibrium level of capital investment.
3.3 Impulse Responses to Net Worth Shocks
Our simulations focus on net worth equation (3.17) whose logarithmic deviation from steady
state is:
nt+1 = 

RK
N
(rk
t   rt) + nt + en;t (3.29)
The shock term en;t may be interpreted as a disturbance to the ability to resell a capital good.
It reﬂects the pecuniary value associated with the disruption of a market. This is similar to
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) ’resaleability constraint’.33 We consider cases where there is some
33There are alternative interpretations to this term. For example, the shock term may represent new
information about future productivity or revenues that is initially reﬂected in equity values; such a rela-
tionship was recently uncovered by Beaudry and Portier (2006).
60persistence to this shock: en;t = 0:65  en;t 1 + t. Such persistence helps the hump-shaped
behavior of several key variables (i.e. positive autocorrelation at short horizons) that is noted
in the data (see Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)).
We now trace through several aspects of a negative shock to net worth. As shown in Figure
3.3, net worth falls sharply, which leads to a hike in credit spreads. This greatly dampens
the credit demand, investment thus falls dramatically, so does asset price. Lower aggregate
demand results in lower output and inﬂation. The central bank will thus lower nominal interest
rate to accommodate the recovery of the economy. Note that on the consumption side, there
are two opposite channels: for the salaried workers, consumption is determined by the interest
rate according to the Euler equation; therefore a easing monetary policy buffers the fall of
their consumption (substitution effect). While for the entrepreneurs, consumption follows a
rule of thumb — a ﬁxed proportion of net worth. After the fall of net worth, entrepreneurial
consumption will fall correspondingly (wealth effect). The ﬁgure shows the total effect on
consumption. Since the wealth effect dominates, total consumption initially falls before
returning to steady state.
Figure 3.3 also summarizes the ’ﬂow of funds’ interpretation of the model. It shows
deviations from steady state of corporate earnings CORPERAN, household savings SAVHH
and investment I in percent of steady state GDP. Retained corporate earnings falls dramatically
reﬂecting both a lower level of investment and a lower rate of return on capital.However,
investment, on the other hand, does not fall as much as corporate earnings, partly due to the
stimulating effect of the expansionary monetary policy. Since Corporate earning is a key source
of funding for investment, after its fall, alternative sources of saving must be available to fund
investment. One source would be household saving. As Figure 3.3 illustrates, total household
consumption does fall. This boosts household saving. However, that drop is initially less than
the drop in household income. For this reason, household savings initially falls below its steady
state value; only after several periods does it rise, before ultimately returning to steady state.
Even so, household austerity, at the margin, helps cushion investment. Under our calibration,
the remaining funding will come from the residual source - the public sector. The ﬁgure also
shows the deadweight loss DW – deviation from its steady state in percent of steady state GDP.
This reﬂects the loss of ﬁnancing resources due to the liquidation of bankrupted ﬁrms.
613.4 Cross-country Evidence from the 2007-09 Crisis
The model’s results are compared to actual data from the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Table 3.1
presents data from several industrialized countries. (The principal data source is Eurostat;
details are provided in an appendix.) A cycle is deﬁned as peak to trough of corporate earnings
(or its proxy, the gross operating surplus), which is typically from mid - 2008 to mid - 2009.
The table shows the change in real investment I over that cycle in percent of initial period
GDP. (Unless otherwise noted, the investment number is private investment; where available,
non-residential investment I(nonres) is also shown. Likewise, the changes in corporate
earnings and household savings, CORPEARN and SAVHH, and private household
consumption CTOT are also shown; as before, the changes are for each country’s cycle and
are in percent of initial period GDP.34
Over the selected cycles, corporate earnings fell on average 5.6% of GDP; in the model,
it fell 5.4% of GDP. In all countries except Australia, investment fell; the average fall of total
investment was 2.8% of GDP; non-residential investment fell by 1.5%; the model yielded a
fall of about 1%. These cross-country data conﬁrm one of the model’s predictions: capital
investment will fall by less than corporate savings.
The data also show that household austerity helps compensate for the fall in corporate
investment. In all countries except Germany and the Netherlands, household savings rose.
Over the cycle, rose on average by 1.4%; the model posted a small loss of -.4% of GDP in the ﬁrst
period, but showed increase in subsequent periods. In six out of nine countries, consumption
falls; on average household consumption falls by 0.4% of GDP; in the model, consumption
falls by 1.1% of GDP. 35 These data illustrate another insight from the model: during periods
of ﬁnancial stress, extra household frugality can help buffer the fall of capital investment by
compensating for ﬁnancing that otherwise fell.
34Additional data on the government budget surplus and the current account deﬁcit are not shown
but are available from the authors. A frequently-used proxy for national savings is investment plus the
current account deﬁcit. Because there were measurement errors, this measure differed substantially from
the sum of corporate, household, and government saving.
35Note that both savings and consumption can rise; this happened in both Australia and the US, and
it implies that while consumption did grow over the period, that growth was modest relative to income
growth.
623.5 Conclusion
This paper studies the role of increased household savings in a ﬁnancial crisis. Following
the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, household savings increased signiﬁcantly in several industrialized
countries, including in the United States. This raised concern among many that higher saving
and lower consumption will lead to stagnation in economic growth.
We examined the role of household frugality in a general equilibrium framework with
ﬁnancial frictions. When households reduce their consumption, output must fall; this is a
standard demand-side effect. But, our analysis suggests that higher saving by more frugal
households may also provide an important cushion for the fall in private investment funding.
In a balance sheet recession, as ﬁrm net worth deteriorates, corporate savings must fall. Such
savings are an important source for private investment funding. Private investment also falls -
but by less. As in a closed economy, investment equals to savings from corporate, households
and government. Given the huge drop in corporate earnings, and large government deﬁcit
following the crisis, extra households’ savings cushion the free fall of investment.
More broadly, our paper has linked together two approaches to macroeconomic analysis.
The more recent emphasis on ﬁnancial sector shocks was shown to have implications for a
more traditional approach, namely investment — savings balance. An adverse ﬁnancial shock
can mean that an economy has lost resources to invest. This is dissaving - not simply paper
losses.
Many conventional analyses of a recession assume that household frugality is the result
of a shock to their own consumption function. When seen this way, it is natural to conclude
that the government should respond in an offsetting way - spending more when the private
sector spends less. Our view differs. We have seen that an adverse ﬁnancial shock will
reduce consumption - mainly through a wealth channel. Since frugal households help offset
the dissaving associated with a ﬁnancial crisis, their behavior also helps cushion the fall of
investment. This is a stabilizing response – not a destabilizing shock.
Inthefuture, thismodelcanbeextendedtoopeneconomytostudytheroleofforeignsaving
or capital ﬂows during a ﬁnancial crisis. A more full-ﬂedged model on the ﬁscal side may also
have implications for ﬁscal policy making.
63Table 3.1: Saving and Investment during the 2007-2009 Crisis
Country Period I(priv) I(nonres) CORPEARN SAVHH CHH
Australia 08/3–09/4 -0.9 -1.0 -0.2 2.6 1.5
France 08/1–9/4 -2.3 -1.0 -2.5 0.2 0.8
Germany 08/2–09/2 -1.1 -2.0 -5.7 -0.6 0.6
Netherlands 08/1–09/2 -3.0 -0.7 -6.3 0.8 -1.2
Sweden 08/4–09/3 -3.0 ... -5.1 1.6 -0.4
United Kindom 08/4–09/2 -7.4 -3.2 -7.7 4.2 -3.6
Canada 08/3–09/2 -3.9 -2.7 -6.2 2.0 -0.3
Japan 08/1–09/1 -2.5 -1.9 -8.6 1.0 -1.3
United Stated 06/3–08/4 -2.4 0.9 -5.3 2.3 0.6
Sample Average -2.9 1.5 -5.3 1.6 -0.4
Model 1 period -1.01 ... -5.4 -0.38 -1.1
2 period -0.91 ... -3.6 -0.09 -1.3
3 period -0.85 ... -2.3 0.05 -1.4
4 period -0.79 ... -1.4 0.14 -1.4
5 period -0.74 ... -0.9 0.19 -1.5
Period Average -0.86 ... -2.7 -0.02 -1.3
64Figure 3.1: GDP growth and contribution of household consumption
Source: National Statistical Agencies/ Eurostat/ Haver Analytics
65Figure 3.2: Corporate savings and private investment
Source: National Statistical Agencies/ Eurostat/ Haver Analytics
66Figure 3.3: Impulse responses to a net worth shock
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70A Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 The Financial Contract
In the ﬁnancial contract, the entrepreneurs maximize expected proﬁt subject to the participation
constraint of the bank,
max
Z 1
!i;a
!EtRk
t+1qtKi
t+1f(!)d!   (1   F(!i;a))!i;aEtRk
t+1qtKi
t+1
subject to
(1   F(!i;a))RL
t+1Li
t+1 + (1   )
Z !i;a
0
!EtRk
t+1qtKi
t+1f(!)d! = R
f
t+1Li
t+1
Recall that
!
i;a
t EtRk
t+1qtKi
t+1 = RL
t+1Li
t+1
The key difference in solving the contract compared to BGG is that, in BGG, the expectation
operator is outside the brackets, since ! itself is not ﬁxed but instead contingent on Rk
t+1:
maxEt
Z 1
!i;a
!Rk
t+1qtKi
t+1f(!)d!   (1   F(!i;a))!i;aRk
t+1qtKi
t+1

subject to
(1   F(!i;a))RL
t+1Li
t+1 + (1   )
Z !i;a
0
!Rk
t+1qtKi
t+1f(!)d! = R
f
t+1Li
t+1
This participation constraint has to hold for each realization of Rk
t+1; therefore, !a is a function
of Rk
t+1. By contrast, in our model the participation constraint only holds for EtRk
t+1 and will
break down ex-post if the realization of Rk
t+1 deviates from expectation.
Deﬁne
 (!i;a) =
Z 1
!i;a
!f(!)d!   (1   F(!i;a))!i;a (A.1)
G(!i;a) =
Z !i;a
0
!f(!)d! (A.2)
The ﬁnancial contract can then be transformed into
max
Ki
t+1;!i;a(1    (!i;a))EtRk
t+1qtKi
t+1
subject to
( (!i;a)   G(!i;a))EtRk
t+1qtKi
t+1 = R
f
t+1(qtKi
t+1   Ni
t+1)
71Deﬁne external ﬁnance premium si =
EtRk
t+1
R
f
t+1
and ﬁrm leverage ratio ki =
Ki
t+1
Ni
t+1 and let  be the
Lagrange multiplier on the bank participation constraint. First-order conditions imply that:
 =
 
0
(!i;a)
 
0(!i;a)   G
0(!i;a)
(A.3)
si =

1    (!i;a) + ( (!i;a)   G(!i;a))
(A.4)
Combining ﬁrst-order conditions with the participation constraint enables us to derive a one-
to-one relationship between the external ﬁnance premium and the cut-off threshold value, as
well as a one-to-one relationship between the leverage ratio and the cut-off threshold value:
si = s(!i;a) =
(!i;a)
1    (!i;a) + (!i;a)( (!i;a)   G(!i;a))
(A.5)
ki = k(!i;a) = 1 +
( (!i;a)   G(!i;a))
1    (!i;a)
(A.6)
Therefore there exists a one-one relationship between the ﬁrm leverage ratio and the external
ﬁnance premium:
ki = '(si) (A.7)
or qtKi
t+1 = '(si)Ni
t+1. Since the leverage ratio is the same across ﬁrms, they pay the same
external risk premium s. We can thus easily aggregate this equation, and derive the following:
qtKt+1 = '(
EtRk
t+1
R
f
t+1
)Nt+1 (A.8)
where Kt+1 and Nt+1 represent aggregate capital and ﬁrm net worth. We can also rewrite this
equation into equation (1.7) in the paper:
EtRk
t+1 = s(
qtKt+1
Nt+1
)R
f
t+1 (A.9)
A.2 First-order Conditions
Uc(ct) = EtRe
t+1(1   t+1)Uc(ct+1) (A.10)
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73A.3 Steady States
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74B Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Solution Strategy and Welfare
The optimality conditions of the model is summarized into the following non-linear system:
Etf(Yt+1;Yt;Xt+1;Xt) = 0 (B.1)
where Et denotes the mathematical expectations operator, conditional on information avail-
able at time t, Yt is the vector of non-predetermined variables, and Xt is the state vector, and
can be partioned as [X1;t;X2;t], where X1;t denotes the vector of endogenous predetermined
variables, while X2;t is the vector of exogenous variables which follows a stochastic process:
X2;t+1 = X2;t + t+1 (B.2)
where the scalars  and matrix  are known parameters, innovation t i.i.d.N(0,I). The
solution of the model is of the form (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)):
Yt = g(Xt;) (B.3)
Xt+1 = h(Xt;) + t+1 (B.4)
Equation (3) and (4) describe the policy function and the transition function respectively.
The deterministic steady states of the model is deﬁned as:
f(Y ;Y ;X;X) = 0 (B.5)
The solution method is to ﬁnd a second-order approximation of the function g(Xt;) and
h(Xt;) around the non-stochastic steady state, where Xt = X and  = 0.
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) show that in contrast to a ﬁrst-order approximation of the
model, where the expected value of any variable equals to its value in the non-stochastic steady
state, in a second-order approximation of the model, the expected value of any variable dif-
fers from its deterministic steady-state value by a constant term. This is critical to our welfare
evaluation. As the conditonal expected welfare 0;t is derived as following:
0;t = 0 +
1
2
2g[0] (B.6)
where 0 = U(c;d;l)=(1   ), the life time utility of the households evaluated at the
deterministic steady state. g is a vector that captures how non-predetermined variables Yt
75reacts to stochastic volatility in the second-order approximation of policy function g. g[0] is
the element in g that corresponds to the variable 0.
The author has used Matlab codes provided by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (avaliable at
http://www.econ.duke.edu/ Grohe ) to analytically derive and numerically evaluate the ﬁrst
and second order derivatives of policy functions.
76C Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Calibration
In the utility function for salaried households, the labor supply elasticity is chosen such that in
steady state, agents spend 1/3 of their time working. The degree of risk aversion is calibrated
at 1 in the baseline analysis; this corresponds to a logarithmic utility function for consump-
tion. The quarterly discount rate is set to 0.99 to match a steady state riskless return of 1 percent.
On the production side, the capital share is calibrated to be 0.33, the share of household
labor is 0.66; the share of entrepreneur labor 0.01. The quarterly depreciation rate of capital is
2.5. Capital adjustment parameter is set to 2, based on estimates by Chirinko (1993).
In the retail sector, the degree of monopolistic competition is calibrated at 6. This implies
a steady state mark-up of 2 percent. The Calvo probability that a ﬁrm cannot adjust price in a
given period is calibrated at 0.75. This implies that retail prices are adjusted on average every
four quarters. For monetary policy, the coefﬁcient on lagged inﬂation rate to 1.2 (satisfying the
Taylor principle) and the autoregressive coefﬁcient is set to 0.65; this places some interest rate
smoothing in monetary policy.
77C.2 Data Description
All data were downloaded from the "G10+ Economic and Financial Indicators Section of Haver
Analytics. The principal source variables, namely GDP, consumption, and investment, were
taken from the national accounts. Unless otherwise noted, the proxy for corporate earnings
was the "gross operating surplus." 36 The ultimate source of the variables is listed by country as
follows:
Australia Australian Bureau of Statistics
Canada Statistics Canada
Finland Statistics Finland
France Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques
Germany Statistisches Bundesamt, Eurostat
Italy Istituto Nazionale di Statistica;Eurostat
Japan Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Ofﬁce
Netherlands Centraal bureau voor de statistiek
Spain Instituto Nacional de Estadistica
Sweden Statistics Sweden
United Kingdom Ofﬁce for National Statistics
United States Bureau of Economic Analysis
36For UK and Canada,"corporate proﬁt" were used. For Finland, "gross operating surplus plus mixed
income" was used. For US, "corporate proﬁts with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjust-
ments" was used. For the Netherlands, "gross operating surplus plus mixed income" was used.
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